Theism and Explanationist Defenses of Moral Realism

Faith and Philosophy 35 (4):447-463 (2018)
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Abstract
Some moral realists have defended moral realism on the basis of the purported fact that moral facts figure as components in some good explanations of non-moral phenomena. In this paper I explore the relationship between theism and this sort of explanationist defense of moral realism. Theistic explanations often make reference to moral facts, and do so in a manner which is ineliminable in an important respect – remove the moral facts from those explanations, and they suffer as a result. In this respect theistic moral explanations seem to differ from the sorts of moral explanations typically offered by moral explanationists.
Reprint years
2018
ISBN(s)
0739-7046  
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BRETAE-6
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-10-17
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2018-10-17

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