Vision, Action, and Make‐Perceive

Mind and Language 23 (4):457-497 (2008)
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Abstract

In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements—an act of what I call ‘make‐perceive’.

Author's Profile

Robert Briscoe
Ohio University

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