A Puzzle about Properties

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):635-650 (2007)
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Abstract

The paper argues that the assumption that there are property designators, together with two theoretically innocent claims, leads to a puzzle, whose solution requires us to reject the position that all (canonical) property designators are rigid. But if we deny that all (canonical) property designators are rigid, then the natural next step is to reject an abundant conception of properties and with it the suggestion that properties are the semantic values of predicates.

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Berit Brogaard
University of Miami

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