Improving invertebrate welfare

Animal Sentience 29 (4) (2020)
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Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that it is wrong, both scientifically and morally, to dismiss the evidence for sentience in invertebrates. They do not offer any examples, however, of how their welfare should be considered or improved. We draw on animal welfare science to suggest some ways that would not be excessively demanding.
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Archival date: 2020-06-28
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Is Humane Slaughter Possible?Browning, Heather & Veit, Walter

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Drawing the Boundaries of Animal Sentience.Veit, Walter & Huebner, Bryce

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