Results for 'animals'

683 found
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  1. Tactful Animals: How the Study of Touch Can Inform the Animal Morality Debate.Susana Monsó & Birte Wrage - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (1):1-27.
    In this paper, we argue that scientists working on the animal morality debate have been operating with a narrow view of morality that prematurely limits the variety of moral practices that animals may be capable of. We show how this bias can be partially corrected by paying more attention to the touch behaviours of animals. We argue that a careful examination of the ways in which animals engage in and navigate touch interactions can shed new light on (...)
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  2. Why Animals Have an Interest in Freedom.Andreas T. Schmidt - 2015 - Historical Social Research 40 (4):92-109.
    Do non-human animals have an interest in sociopolitical freedom? Cochrane has recently taken up this important yet largely neglected quest ion. He argues that animal freedom is not a relevant moral concern in itself, because animals have a merely instrumental but not an intrinsic interest in freedom (Cochrane 2009a, 2012). This paper will argue that even if animals have a merely instrumental interest in freedom, animal freedom should nonetheless be an important goal for our relationships with (...). Drawing on recent work on the value of freedom, it will be argued that freedom is non-specifically instrumentally valuable. Accordingly, freedom is a means to other goods, but often it is not possible to identify those goods in advance or aim for them directly. Some of the reasons that make freedom non-specifically valuable for human relationships, it will be argued, also apply to relationships between humans and animals. Amongst other implications, it will be shown how this argument provides a response to those who fear that stricter animal protection policies might undermine people’s freedom: A concern for freedom actually requires stricter protection policies rather than speak against them. (shrink)
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  3. Animals.Gary Hatfield - 2008 - In Janet Broughton & John Carriero (eds.), Companion to Descartes. Blackwell. pp. 404–425.
    This chapter considers philosophical problems concerning non-human (and sometimes human) animals, including their metaphysical, physical, and moral status, their origin, what makes them alive, their functional organization, and the basis of their sensitive and cognitive capacities. I proceed by assuming what most of Descartes’s followers and interpreters have held: that Descartes proposed that animals lack sentience, feeling, and genuinely cognitive representations of things. (Some scholars interpret Descartes differently, denying that he excluded sentience, feeling, and representation from animals, (...)
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  4. ‘Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others’: The Hierarchy of Citizenship in Austria.Dr Suleman Lazarus - 2019 - Laws 8 (14):1-20.
    While this article aims to explore the connections between citizenship and ‘race’, it is the first study to use fictional tools as a sociological resource in exemplifying the deviation between citizenship in principle and practice in an Austrian context. The study involves interviews with 73 Austrians from three ethnic/racial groups, which were subjected to a directed approach to qualitative content analysis and coded based on sentences from George Orwell’s fictional book, ‘Animal Farm’. By using fiction as a conceptual and analytical (...)
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  5. The Claims of Animals and the Needs of Strangers: Two Cases of Imperfect Right.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2018 - Journal of Practical Ethics 6 (1):19-51.
    This paper argues for a conception of the natural rights of non-human animals grounded in Kant’s explanation of the foundation of human rights. The rights in question are rights that are in the first instance held against humanity collectively speaking—against our species conceived as an organized body capable of collective action. The argument proceeds by first developing a similar case for the right of every human individual who is in need of aid to get it, and then showing why (...)
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  6.  87
    How to Tell If Animals Can Understand Death.Susana Monsó - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    It is generally assumed that humans are the only animals who can possess a concept of death. However, the ubiquity of death in nature and the evolutionary advantages that would come with an understanding of death provide two prima facie reasons for doubting this assumption. In this paper, my intention is not to defend that animals of this or that nonhuman species possess a concept of death, but rather to examine how we could go about empirically determining whether (...)
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  7. Animals, Advance Directives, and Prudence: Should We Let the Cheerfully Demented Die?David Limbaugh - 2016 - Ethics, Medicine and Public Health 2 (4):481-489.
    A high level of confidence in the identity of individuals is required to let them die as ordered by an advance directive. Thus, if we are animalists, then we should lack the confidence required to apply lethal advance directives to the cheerfully demented, or so I argue. In short, there is consensus among animalists that the best way to avoid serious objections to their account is to adopt an ontology that denies the existence of brains, hands, tables, chairs, iced-tea, and (...)
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  8. Zoo Animals as Specimens, Zoo Animals as Friends.Abigail Levin - 2015 - Environmental Philosophy 12 (1):21-44.
    The international protest surrounding the Copenhagen Zoo’s recent decision to kill a healthy giraffe in the name of population management reveals a deep moral tension between contemporary zoological display practices — which induce zoo - goers to view certain animals as individuals, quasi - persons, or friends — and the traditional objectives of zoos, which ask us only to view animals as specimens. I argue that these zoological display practices give rise to moral obligations on the part of (...)
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  9. Animals and Language.Arran Stibbe & George Jacobs - 2006 - Society and Animals 14 (1):1-7.
    This is the introduction to a special issue of the journal. The special issue deals with the language humans use to talk about our fellow animals. The introduction introduces each of the articles.
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  10. Nonhuman Animals in Adam Smith's Moral Theory.Alejandra Mancilla - 2009 - Between the Species 13 (9).
    By giving sympathy a central role, Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) can be regarded as one of the ‘enlightened’ moral theories of the Enlightenment, insofar as it widened the scope of moral consideration beyond the traditionally restricted boundary of human beings. This, although the author himself does not seem to have been aware of this fact. In this paper, I want to focus on two aspects which I think lead to this conclusion. First, by making sentience the requisite (...)
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  11. Animals, Identity and Persistence.Christopher Belshaw - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):401 - 419.
    A number of claims are closely connected with, though logically distinct from, animalism. One is that organisms cease to exist when they die. Two others concern the relation of the brain, or the brainstem, to animal life. One of these holds that the brainstem is necessary for life?more precisely, that (say) my cat's brainstem is necessary for my cat's life to continue. The other is that it is sufficient for life?more precisely, that so long as (say) my cat's brainstem continues (...)
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  12. Normative Practices of Other Animals.Sarah Vincent, Rebecca Ring & Kristin Andrews - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology. New York: pp. 57-83.
    Traditionally, discussions of moral participation – and in particular moral agency – have focused on fully formed human actors. There has been some interest in the development of morality in humans, as well as interest in cultural differences when it comes to moral practices, commitments, and actions. However, until relatively recently, there has been little focus on the possibility that nonhuman animals have any role to play in morality, save being the objects of moral concern. Moreover, when nonhuman cases (...)
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  13. Consequentialism and Nonhuman Animals.Tyler John & Jeff Sebo - forthcoming - In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 564-591.
    Consequentialism is thought to be in significant conflict with animal rights theory because it does not regard activities such as confinement, killing, and exploitation as in principle morally wrong. Proponents of the “Logic of the Larder” argue that consequentialism results in an implausibly pro-exploitation stance, permitting us to eat farmed animals with positive well- being to ensure future such animals exist. Proponents of the “Logic of the Logger” argue that consequentialism results in an implausibly anti-conservationist stance, permitting us (...)
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  14. Do Animals See Objects?Paweł Grabarczyk - 2013 - In Marcin Miłkowski Konrad Talmont-Kamiński (ed.), Regarding Mind, Naturally.
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  15. The Euthanasia of Companion Animals.Michael Cholbi - 2017 - In Christine Overall (ed.), Pets and People: The Ethics of our Relationships with Companion Animals. Oxford University Press. pp. 264-278.
    Argues that considerations central to the justification of euthanizing humans do not readily extrapolate to the euthanasia of pets and companion animals; that the comparative account of death's badness can be successfully applied to such animals to ground the justification of their euthanasia and its timing; and proposes that companion animal guardians have authority to decide to euthanize such animals because of their epistemic standing regarding such animals' welfare.
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  16. Animals, Brains, and Spirits.Charles Taliaferro - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):567-581.
    This paper contains an overview of the significance of dualism for theism and a modal argument for dualism. It concludes with remarks on the relevance of the modal case on behalf of dualism for an intramural materialist quarrel between animalists and brain-identity theorists.
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  17. The Mere Considerability of Animals.Mylan Engel Jr - 2001 - Acta Analytica 16:89-108.
    Singer and Regan predicate their arguments -- for ethical vegetarianism, against animal experimentation, and for an end to animal exploitation generally -- on the equal considerability premise (EC). According to (EC), we owe humans and sentient nonhumans exactly the same degree of moral considerability. While Singer's and Regan's conclusions follow from (EC), many philosophers reject their arguments because they find (EC)'s implications morally repugnant and intuitively unacceptable. Like most people, you probably reject (EC). Never the less, you're already committed to (...)
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  18. Schopenhauer on the Rights of Animals.Stephen Puryear - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):250-269.
    I argue that Schopenhauer’s ascription of (moral) rights to animals flows naturally from his distinctive analysis of the concept of a right. In contrast to those who regard rights as fundamental and then cast wrongdoing as a matter of violating rights, he takes wrong (Unrecht) to be the more fundamental notion and defines the concept of a right (Recht) in its terms. He then offers an account of wrongdoing which makes it plausible to suppose that at least many (...) can be wronged and thus, by extension, have rights. The result, I argue, is a perspective on the nature of moral rights in general, and the idea of animal rights in particular, that constitutes an important and plausible alternative to the more familiar views advanced by philosophers in recent decades. (shrink)
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  19. Instrumental Reasoning in Nonhuman Animals.Elisabeth Camp & Eli Shupe - 2017 - In Kristin Andrews & Jake Beck (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds. London, UK: pp. 100-118.
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  20. Varieties of Harm to Animals in Industrial Farming.Matthew C. Halteman - 2011 - Journal of Animal Ethics 1 (2):122-131.
    Skeptics of the moral case against industrial farming often assert that harm to animals in industrial systems is limited to isolated instances of abuse that do not reflect standard practice and thus do not merit criticism of the industry at large. I argue that even if skeptics are correct that abuse is the exception rather than the rule, they must still answer for two additional varieties of serious harm to animals that are pervasive in industrial systems: procedural harm (...)
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  21. Kant and Moral Responsibility for Animals.Helga Varden - 2020 - In Lucy Allais & John J. Callanan (eds.), Kant on Animals. Oxford: pp. 157-175.
    Working out a Kantian theory of moral responsibility for animals2 requires the untying of two philosophical and interpretive knots: i.) How to interpret Kant’s claim in the important “episodic” section of the Doctrine of Virtue that we do not have duties “to” animals, since such duties are only “with regard to” animals and “directly to” ourselves; and ii.) How to explain why animals don’t have rights, while human beings who (currently or permanently) don’t have sufficient reason for (...)
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  22. Guest Editors' Introduction: Animals and Language.George Jacobs & Arran Stibbe - 2006 - Society and Animals 14 (1):1-7.
    The twentieth century saw what could be described as a parting of the ways between humans and other species of animal in many parts of the world. Increasing urbanization and the intensification of farming resulted in restricted opportunities to interact directly with other animals, particularly freeroaming animals in their natural habitats. At the same time, changes in technology led to greatly increased opportunities to come into contact with animals indirectly through their representation in media such as film, (...)
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  23. What Are Animals Conscious Of?Alain Morin (ed.) - 2012 - Columbia Press.
    There is little doubt that animals are ―conscious‖. Animals hunt prey, escape predators, explore new environments, eat, mate, learn, feel, and so forth. If one defines consciousness as being aware of external events and experiencing mental states such as sensations and emotions (Natsoulas, 1978), then gorillas, dogs, bears, horses, pigs, pheasants, cats, rabbits, snakes, magpies, wolves, elephants, and lions, to name a few creatures, clearly qualify. The contentious issue rather is: Do these animals know that they are (...)
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  24. Animals and Objectivity.Colin McLear - 2020 - In Lucy Allais & John Callanan (eds.), Kant and Animals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 42-65.
    Starting from the assumption that Kant allows for the possible existence of conscious sensory states in non-rational animals, I examine the textual and philosophical grounds for his acceptance of the possibility that such states are also 'objective'. I elucidate different senses of what might be meant in crediting a cognitive state as objective. I then put forward and defend an interpretation according to which the cognitive states of animals, though extremely limited on Kant's view, are nevertheless minimally objective.
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  25. Animals & Ethics 101: Thinking Critically About Animal Rights.Nathan Nobis - 2016 - Open Philosophy Press.
    This book provides an overview of the current debates about the nature and extent of our moral obligations to animals. Which, if any, uses of animals are morally wrong, which are morally permissible and why? What, if any, moral obligations do we, individually and as a society, have towards animals and why? How should animals be treated? Why? We will explore the most influential and most developed answers to these questions – given by philosophers, scientists, and (...)
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  26. Animals as Reflexive Thinkers: The Aponoian Paradigm.Mark Rowlands & Susana Monsó - 2017 - In Linda Kalof (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Animal Studies. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 319-341.
    The ability to engage in reflexive thought—in thought about thought or about other mental states more generally—is regarded as a complex intellectual achievement that is beyond the capacities of most nonhuman animals. To the extent that reflexive thought capacities are believed necessary for the possession of many other psychological states or capacities, including consciousness, belief, emotion, and empathy, the inability of animals to engage in reflexive thought calls into question their other psychological abilities. This chapter attacks the idea (...)
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  27. Artificial Neural Network for Predicting Animals Category.Ibrahim M. Nasser & Samy S. Abu-Naser - 2019 - International Journal of Academic and Applied Research (IJAAR) 3 (2):18-24.
    Abstract: In this paper an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) model, was developed and tested for predicting the category of an animal. There is a number of factors that influence the classification of animals. Such as the existence of hair/ feather, if the animal gives birth or spawns, it is airborne, aquatic, predator, toothed, backboned, venomous, has –fins, has-tail, cat-sized, and domestic. They were then used as input variables for the ANN model. A model based on the Multilayer Perceptron Topology (...)
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  28. Rewired Animals and Sensory Substitution: The Cause is Not Cortical Plasticity.Kevin O'Regan - 2018 - Proceedings of the British Academy 219.
    Cortical plasticity is often invoked to explain changes in the quality or location of experience observed in rewired animals, in sensory substitution, in extension of the body through tool use, and in the rubber hand illusion. However this appeal to cortical plasticity may be misleading, because it suggest that the cortical areas that are plastic are themselves the loci of generation of experience. This would be an error, I claim, since cortical areas do not generate experience. Cortical areas participate (...)
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  29. Beyond Anthropomorphism: Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals.Kristin Andrews - 2011 - In Tom L. Beauchamp R. G. Frey (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 469--494.
    In the context of animal cognitive research, anthropomorphism is defined as the attribution of uniquely human mental characteristics to animals. Those who worry about anthropomorphism in research, however, are immediately confronted with the question of which properties are uniquely human. One might think that researchers must first hypothesize the existence of a feature in an animal before they can, with warrant, claim that the property is uniquely human. But all too often, this isn't the approach. Rather, there is an (...)
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  30. Collective Intentionality in Non-Human Animals.Robert A. Wilson - 2017 - In Marija Jankovic and Kirk Ludwig (ed.), Routledge Handbook on Collective Intentionality. New York, NY, USA: pp. 420-432.
    I think there is something to be said in a positive and constructive vein about collective intentionality in non-human animals. Doing so involves probing at the concept of collective intentionality fairly directly (Section 2), considering the various forms that collective intentionality might take (Section 3), showing some sensitivity to the history of appeals to that concept and its close relatives (Section 4), and raising some broader questions about the relationships between sociality, cognition, and institutions by discussing two different possible (...)
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  31. Human Beings, Human Animals, and Mentalistic Survival.Denis Robinson - 2007 - In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 3-32.
    I critically discuss both the particular doctrinal and general meta-philosophical or methodological tenets of Mark Johnston's paper "Human Beings", attending to several weaknesses in his argument. One of the most important amongst them is an apparent reliance on a substitution of identicals within an intensional context as he argues that continuity of functioning brain is essential to the persistence of "Human Beings" as allegedly singled out by his methodology; another equally important is a simple lacuna in place of an argument (...)
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  32. Animals as Stakeholders.Joshua Smart - forthcoming - In Natalie Thomas (ed.), Animals and Business Ethics. Springer.
    Animals have moral status, and we have corresponding obligations to take their interests into account. I argue that Stakeholder Theory provides a moderate, yet principled way for businesses to do so. Animals ought to be treated as stakeholders given that they affect and are affected by the achievement of the objectives of the businesses in which they are involved. Stakeholder Theory therefore requires taking those interests into account. It does not, however, require that they be given the same (...)
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  33. If I Could Talk to the Animals: Measuring Subjective Animal Welfare.Heather Browning - 2019 - Dissertation, Australian National University
    Animal welfare is a concept that plays a role within both our moral deliberations and the relevant areas of science. The study of animal welfare has impacts on decisions made by legislators, producers and consumers with regards to housing and treatment of animals. Our ethical deliberations in these domains need to consider our impact on animals, and the study of animal welfare provides the information that allows us to make informed decisions. This thesis focusses on taking a philosophical (...)
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  34. ‘What’s Teleology Got To Do With It?’ A Reinterpretation of Aristotle’s Generation of Animals V.Mariska Leunissen & Allan Gotthelf - 2010 - Phronesis 55 (4):325-356.
    Despite the renewed interest in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals in recent years, the subject matter of GA V, its preferred mode(s) of explanation, and its place in the treatise as a whole remain misunderstood. Scholars focus on GA I-IV, which explain animal generation in terms of efficient-final causation, but dismiss GA V as a mere appendix, thinking it to concern (a) individual, accidental differences among animals, which are (b) purely materially necessitated, and (c) are only tangentially related to (...)
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  35. Of Animals, Robots and Men.Christine Tiefensee & Johannes Marx - 2015 - Historical Social Research 40:70-91.
    Domesticated animals need to be treated as fellow citizens: only if we conceive of domesticated animals as full members of our political communities can we do justice to their moral standing—or so Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka argue in their widely discussed book Zoopolis. In this contribution, we pursue two objectives. Firstly, we reject Donaldson and Kymlicka’s appeal for animal citizenship. We do so by submitting that instead of paying due heed to their moral status, regarding animals (...)
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  36. Is (Merely) Stalking Sentient Animals Morally Wrong?Jason Kawall - 2000 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (2):195–204.
    Such activities as tracking, watching, and photographing animals are frequently presented as morally superior alternatives to hunting, but could they themselves be morally problematic? In this paper I argue that, despite certain differences from the stalking of humans, a strong case can be made for the prima facie wrongness of stalking sentient animals. The chief harm of stalking is the fear and altered patterns of behavior which it forces upon its victims.
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  37. Moral Animals[REVIEW] Hooley - 2014 - Journal of Animal Ethics 4 (2):86-92,.
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  38. Animals, Relations, and the Laissez-Faire Intuition.Trevor Hedberg - 2016 - Environmental Values 25 (4):427-442.
    In Animal Ethics in Context, Clare Palmer tries to harmonise two competing approaches to animal ethics. One focuses on the morally relevant capacities that animals possess. The other is the Laissez-Faire Intuition (LFI): the claim that we have duties to assist domesticated animals but should (at least generally) leave wild animals alone. In this paper, I critique the arguments that Palmer offers in favour of the No-Contact LFI - the view that we have (prima facie) duties not (...)
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  39. Animals, Misanthropy, and Humanity.Ian James Kidd - 2020 - Journal of Animal Ethics 10 (1):66.
    David. E. Cooper’s claim in Animals and Misanthropy is that honest reflection on the ways human beings treat and compare with animals encourages a dark, misanthropic judgment on humankind. Treatment of animals manifests a range of vices and failings that are ubiquitous and entrenched in our practices, institutions, and forms of life, organized by Cooper into five clusters. Moreover, comparisons of humans and animals reveals both affinities and similarities, including a crucial difference that animals are (...)
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  40. The Beliefs of Mute Animals.Simone Gozzano - 2007 - In Mario De Caro, Francesco Ferretti & Massimo Marraffa (eds.), Cartography of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    In this paper I argue that it is possible to attribute beliefs and other intentional states to mute animals. This kind of attribution is substantial, in that it does allow for some minimal form of co-referential failure.
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  41. Animals, Slaves, and Corporations: Analyzing Legal Thinghood.Visa A. J. Kurki - 2017 - German Law Journal 18 (5):1070-1090.
    The Article analyzes the notion of legal “thinghood” in the context of the person–thing bifurcation. In legal scholarship, there are numerous assumptions pertaining to this definition that are often not spelled out. In addition, one’s chosen definition of “thing” is often simply taken to be the correct one. The Article scrutinizes these assumptions and definitions. First, a brief history of the bifurcation is offered. Second, three possible definitions of “legal thing” are examined: Things as nonpersons, things as rights and duties, (...)
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    Moral Animals and Moral Responsibility.Albert W. Musschenga - 2015 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 10 (2):38-59.
    Albert Musschenga | : The central question of this article is, Are animals morally responsible for what they do? Answering this question requires a careful, step-by-step argument. In sections 1 and 2, I explain what morality is, and that having a morality means following moral rules or norms. In sections 3 and 4, I argue that some animals show not just regularities in their social behaviour, but can be rightly said to follow social norms. But are the norms (...)
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    Protozoans: Animals or Protists?Dr Ak Verma - 2021 - International Journal of Life Sciences 9 (1):41-44.
    Protozoans are single celled eukaryotes found worldwide with rich biodiversity. The protozoan species live in different habitats as free living or parasite having different shapes and adapted for various physiological activities. These are microscopic unicellular eukaryotes that have a relatively complex internal structure and carry out complex metabolic activities within a cell by highly specialized subcellular organelles like pseudopodia, flagella and cilia. Initially protozoans were kept in phylum Protozoa under kingdom Animalia as per classification of Linnaeus but later placed under (...)
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  44. Infants, Animals, and the Origins of Number.Eric Margolis - 2017 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40.
    Where do human numerical abilities come from? This article is a commentary on Leibovich et al.’s “From 'sense of number' to 'sense of magnitude' —The role of continuous magnitudes in numerical cognition”. Leibovich et al. argue against nativist views of numerical development by noting limitations in newborns’ vision and limitations regarding newborns’ ability to individuate objects. I argue that these considerations do not undermine competing nativist views and that Leibovich et al.'s model itself presupposes that infant learners have numerical representations.
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  45. Merely Living Animals in Aristotle.Refik Güremen - 2015 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 9 (1):115.
    : In Parts of Animals II.10, 655b37-656a8, Aristotle tacitly identifies a group of animals which partake of “ living only”. This paper is an attempt to understand the nature of this group. It is argued that it is possible to make sense of this designation if we consider that some animals, which are solely endowed with the contact senses, do nothing more than mere immediate nutrition by their perceptive nature and have no other action. It is concluded (...)
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  46. The Blind Hens' Challenge: Does It Undermine the View That Only Welfare Matters in Our Dealings with Animals?Peter Sandøe, Paul M. Hocking, Bjorn Förkman, Kirsty Haldane, Helle H. Kristensen & Clare Palmer - 2014 - Environmental Values 23 (6):727-742.
    Animal ethicists have recently debated the ethical questions raised by disenhancing animals to improve their welfare. Here, we focus on the particular case of breeding hens for commercial egg-laying systems to become blind, in order to benefit their welfare. Many people find breeding blind hens intuitively repellent, yet ‘welfare-only’ positions appear to be committed to endorsing this possibility if it produces welfare gains. We call this the ‘Blind Hens’ Challenge’. In this paper, we argue that there are both empirical (...)
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  47. The Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals.Paul Waldau - 2001 - Oxford University Press USA.
    The concept of speciesism, coined in 1970 as an analogy to racism, has been discussed almost exclusively within philosophical circles. Here, Waldau looks at how non-human animals have been viewed in the Buddhist and Christian religious traditions.
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  48. Elephants Who Marry Mice Are Very Unusual: The Use of the Relative Pronoun Who with Nonhuman Animals.Gaëtanelle Gilquin & George Jacobs - 2006 - Society and Animals 14 (1):79-105.
    This paper explores the use of the relative pronoun with nonhuman animals. The paper looks at what dictionaries, an encyclopedia, grammars, publication manuals, newspapers, and news agencies say and do relative to this issue. In addition to investigating the views and practices of these authoritative publications, the study also searched a 100-million-word collection of spoken and written English. The study found that while some reference works reject or ignore the use of with nonhuman animals, other works discuss the (...)
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  49. Fighting Fair: The Ecology of Honor in Humans and Animals.Dan Demetriou - 2015 - In Jonathan Crane (ed.), Beastly Morality. Columbia University Press. pp. 123-154.
    This essay distinguishes between honor-typical and authoritarian behavior in humans and animals. Whereas authoritarianism concerns hierarchies coordinated by control and obedience, honor concerns rankings of prestige determined by fair contests. Honor-typical behavior is identifiable in non-human species, and is to be expected in polygynous species with non-resource-based mating systems. This picture lends further support to an increasingly popular psychological theory that sees morality as constituted by a variety of moral systems. If moral cognition is pluralistic in this way, then (...)
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  50. Crushing Animals and Crashing Funerals: The Semiotics of Free Expression.Harold Anthony Lloyd - 2012 - First Amendment Law Review 12.
    With insights from philosophy of language and semiotics, this article addresses judicial choices and semantic errors involved in United States v. Stevens, 130 S.Ct. 1577 (2010) (refusing to read “killing” and “wounding” to include cruelty and thus striking down a federal statute outlawing videos of animal cruelty), and Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011) (finding a First Amendment right to picket military funerals and verbally attack parents of dead soldiers as part of purportedly-public expression). -/- This article maintains that (...)
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