Metaphor as a Function of Language, Intention, and Interpretation

Gnosis 3 (1):18-34 (1987)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Metaphor straddles both epistemology and metaphysics. What makes metaphor elusive is intimately bound up in its dual character, a "thing" of the imagination covering both knowledge and reality. Due to its unique position, metaphor is often only understood up to a certain point: we frame it solely as a concern of knowledge or only as a matter of what is. In order to appreciate the impact metaphor has for both of these realms, this paper takes up three constitutive concepts of metaphor (truth, meaning, and reference), and attempts to understand what the content is of each on both sides of the epistemology/metaphysics fence.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-01-25

Downloads
257 (#59,385)

6 months
78 (#54,975)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?