Putnam and Davidson on Coherence, Truth, and Justification

The Science of Mind 54:51-70 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Putnam and Davidson both defended coherence theories of justification from the early 1980s onward. There are interesting similarities between these theories, and Putnam’s philosophical development lead to further convergence in the 1990s. The most conspicuous difference between Putnam’s and Davidson’s theories is that they appear to fundamentally disagree on the role and nature of conceptual schemes, but a closer look reveals that they are not as far apart on this issue as usually assumed. The veridicality of perceptual beliefs is a cornerstone of both Davidson’s and Putnam’s later (but not earlier) coherentism. However, this thesis introduces a form of weak foundationalism into their theories, and consequently, those are strictly speaking not pure coherence theories, but hybrids between coherentism and foundationalism.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BROPAD-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-05-18
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-05-18

Total views
521 ( #5,093 of 40,765 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
146 ( #2,728 of 40,765 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.