Shame vs. Guilt: Is there a difference?

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Abstract
In this article, I argue that guilt and shame are not distinctive emotions. Instead, guilt is best seen as a kind of shame. I present three reasons for this view: First, guilt cannot merely arise as a consequence of how we evaluate our behaviour, since how we act implicates the whole self. Second, guilt cannot be relieved by taking responsibility, apologising and making amends unless it is a kind of shame. Third, the empirical research that seems to show that ‘shame’ and ‘guilt’ are distinct can be explained by re-interpreting the data.
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Archival date: 2021-04-08
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2021-04-08

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