The Value of a Person

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68 (1):167 - 198 (1994)
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Abstract

(for Adam Morton's half) I argue that if we take the values of persons to be ordered in a way that allows incomparability, then the problems Broome raises have easy solutions. In particular we can maintain that creating people is morally neutral while killing them has a negative value.

Author Profiles

John Broome
University Of Oxford
Adam Morton
PhD: Princeton University; Last affiliation: University of British Columbia

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