The Value of a Person

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Abstract
(for Adam Morton's half) I argue that if we take the values of persons to be ordered in a way that allows incomparability, then the problems Broome raises have easy solutions. In particular we can maintain that creating people is morally neutral while killing them has a negative value.
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BROTVO-7
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Archival date: 2014-03-10
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2011-05-29

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