The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux

Philosophy of Science 80 (3):378-397 (2013)
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Fitelson (1999) demonstrates that the validity of various arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory depends on which confirmation measure is adopted. The present paper adds to the results set out in Fitelson (1999), expanding on them in two principal respects. First, it considers more confirmation measures. Second, it shows that there are important arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory and that there is no confirmation measure that renders them all valid. Finally, the paper reviews the ramifications that this "strengthened problem of measure sensitivity" has for Bayesian confirmation theory and discusses whether it points at pluralism about notions of confirmation.

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Peter Brössel
Ruhr-Universität Bochum


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