View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

9 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. Counterfactuals and the 'Grue-Speaker'.Alfred Schramm - manuscript
    Freitag (2015) and Schramm (2014) have proposed different, although converging, solutions of Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. Answering their proposals, Dorst (2016 and 2018) has used the fictitious character of a ‘grue-speaker’ as his principal device for criticizing counterfactual-based treatments of the Riddle. In this paper, I argue that Dorst’s arguments fail: On the observation of no other than green emeralds, the ‘grue-speaker’ cannot use the symmetry between the ‘green’- and ‘grue’-languages for claiming ‘grue’- instead of ‘green’-evidence, and the counterfactuals (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Resolving the Raven Paradox: Simple Random Sampling, Stratified Random Sampling, and Inference to the Best Explanation.Barry Ward - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    Simple random sampling resolutions of the raven paradox relevantly diverge from scientific practice. We develop a stratified random sampling model, yielding a better fit and apparently rehabilitating simple random sampling as a legitimate idealization. However, neither accommodates a second concern, the objection from potential bias. We develop a third model that crucially invokes causal considerations, yielding a novel resolution that handles both concerns. This approach resembles Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) and relates the generalization’s confirmation to confirmation of an (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Channels’ Confirmation and Predictions’ Confirmation: From the Medical Test to the Raven Paradox.Chenguang Lu - 2020 - Entropy 22 (4):384.
    After long arguments between positivism and falsificationism, the verification of universal hypotheses was replaced with the confirmation of uncertain major premises. Unfortunately, Hemple proposed the Raven Paradox. Then, Carnap used the increment of logical probability as the confirmation measure. So far, many confirmation measures have been proposed. Measure F proposed by Kemeny and Oppenheim among them possesses symmetries and asymmetries proposed by Elles and Fitelson, monotonicity proposed by Greco et al., and normalizing property suggested by many researchers. Based on the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Confirmation Versus Falsificationism.Ray Scott Percival - 2015 - In Robin L. Cautin & Scott O. Lilienfeld (eds.), Encyclopedia of Clinical Psychology.
    Confirmation and falsification are different strategies for testing theories and characterizing the outcomes of those tests. Roughly speaking, confirmation is the act of using evidence or reason to verify or certify that a statement is true, definite, or approximately true, whereas falsification is the act of classifying a statement as false in the light of observation reports. After expounding the intellectual history behind confirmation and falsificationism, reaching back to Plato and Aristotle, I survey some of the main controversial issues and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. On the Equivalence of Goodman’s and Hempel’s Paradoxes.Kenneth Boyce - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45:32-42.
    Historically, Nelson Goodman’s paradox involving the predicates ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’ has been taken to furnish a serious blow to Carl Hempel’s theory of confirmation in particular and to purely formal theories of confirmation in general. In this paper, I argue that Goodman’s paradox is no more serious of a threat to Hempel’s theory of confirmation than is Hempel’s own paradox of the ravens. I proceed by developing a suggestion from R. D. Rosenkrantz into an argument for the conclusion that these (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. A New Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens.Susanna Rinard - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):81-100.
    The canonical Bayesian solution to the ravens paradox faces a problem: it entails that black non-ravens disconfirm the hypothesis that all ravens are black. I provide a new solution that avoids this problem. On my solution, black ravens confirm that all ravens are black, while non-black non-ravens and black non-ravens are neutral. My approach is grounded in certain relations of epistemic dependence, which, in turn, are grounded in the fact that the kind raven is more natural than the kind black. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  7. The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux.Peter Brössel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (3):378-397.
    Fitelson (1999) demonstrates that the validity of various arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory depends on which confirmation measure is adopted. The present paper adds to the results set out in Fitelson (1999), expanding on them in two principal respects. First, it considers more confirmation measures. Second, it shows that there are important arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory and that there is no confirmation measure that renders them all valid. Finally, the paper reviews the ramifications that this "strengthened problem of measure (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  8. The Logic of Theory Assessment.Franz Huber - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (5):511-538.
    This paper starts by indicating the analysis of Hempel's conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation (Hempel, 1945) as presented in Huber (submitted). There I argue contra Carnap (1962, Section 87) that Hempel felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at plausible theories and another aiming at informative theories. However, he also realized that these two concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming at informative theories. The main part of the paper (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  9. Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.
    According to Hempel's paradox, evidence (E) that an object is a nonblack nonraven confirms the hypothesis (H) that every raven is black. According to the standard Bayesian solution, E does confirm H but only to a minute degree. This solution relies on the almost never explicitly defended assumption that the probability of H should not be affected by evidence that an object is nonblack. I argue that this assumption is implausible, and I propose a way out for Bayesians. Introduction Hempel's (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations