Abstract

There is a well-established project in moral philosophy which seeks to demarcate deontological normative theories from consequentialist normative theories by defining deontology and deontological restrictions exclusively in terms of their agent-relativity. My aim in this paper is to explain why this project is mistaken and to defend both the possibility and the plausibility of agent-neutral deontological restrictions. I will argue that the common rationale underwriting the alleged agent-relativity of deontological restrictions is not, in fact, deontological at all. If deontological restrictions (qua prohibitions on the performance of particular action-types by particular agents) are to be agent-relative restrictions in the sense that they are grounded in the idea that agents have a special responsibility not to violate them themselves – qua authors of their own actions – then these agent-relative restrictions are best understood as agent-relative consequentialist restrictions. Genuinely deontological restrictions, on the other hand, are agent-neutral restrictions in the sense that they apply to anyone and everyone and are grounded in the inviolable status of those victimised.