The theoretical underpinnings of public international law have taken the sovereign status of the nation-state for granted since the beginning of the modern era. After centuries of evolution in legal and political thought, the state's definition as a bounded territorial unit has been strictly codified. The legal development of the nation-state was an ideological project informed by extra-legal considerations. Additionally, the ever-narrowing scope of the juridical idea of sovereignty functioned as a boundary mechanism instrumental in colonising Africa and (...) other regions. While international law claims universal liberalism today, the current system based on sovereign nation-states represents not social inclusion but fierce and dangerous exclusion. -/- The central thesis of this book is that the development of legal sovereignty was, rather than part of the modernist progress narrative, a historically contingent evolutionary regression. While other social systems such as economics and science became globalised, politics and law counterintuitively became more territorialised. It is argued that the nation-state today is not only anachronistic but is dangerously ill-equipped for facing international problems such as the climate crisis or global pandemics. Finally, it also leaves African states and many other formerly-colonised territories at a particular disadvantage by regulating their political practices into a predefined mould. (shrink)

The Constitution is the highest law of the country, while international law is a field of law that deals with the rights and obligations between countries. The essence of international community is of decentralized nature, in which the legal order is formed according to the principle of sovereign equality. However, there are many perspectives that approach the international community and international law from a universalistic and idealistic viewpoint. In other words, if the positivist and pseudo-oriented view (...) of international law is the reality of international community and international law, the universalist or idealist perception of international law can be said to be their goals. It is true that those two perspectives on international community and international law are neither omnicient nor all-perceiving, but complexly intertwined. The Constitution and international law, which can be considered the two axes of public law, are closely interrelated to the formation of a modern absolute state and civic democracy. The absoluteness of state power and civic democracy are doomed to fate our present and our future. This is not only such fundamental political order, but it also has become a foundation for the development of modern and contemporary order of law. And the two dimensions of order, politics and law, are developing in a dialectical manner. Under this background, this paper aims to provide a harmonious view sprucing up the reality of public law that penetrates both of the international and domestic society within a large framework. It is for research purpose and needs an effort of work by reviewing and analyzing the essence, commonalities, and differences among various adjacent concepts of the Constitution and international law discourse. This paper first begins with a discussion by presenting the historical development of existing hard legal system that penetrates the Constitution and international law through their realistic framework. Furthermore, we look at the softness of international law, conceptual discourse on the international law and world law, international constitutionalism and constitutional theory, and a compendium of world administrative law. We look at the background for the development of these commentaries, the main topics of discussion, and their commonalities or differences. Finally we briefly diagnose and place the future of new sermons that needs to be adduced due to changes in the international community. (shrink)

This paper presents preliminary results of a survey experiment examining the effects of international illegality on public support for proposed public policies. It adds three specific dimensions to the existing literature. First, it tests whether the effects of international illegality differ depending on the international regime whose rules are violated, testing the effects of violations of both human rights and trade regimes. Second, it tests how far the involvement of international courts vary these effects. (...) And third, it examines these questions using parallel studies with UK and US respondents to test the robustness and generalisability of the relations identified. Results confirm that, across both jurisdictions, illegality under either trade or human rights regimes, and with or without the additional involvement of an international court, have a statistically significant negative effect of public support for a policy. They further identify a greater negative effect where an international court has confirmed this illegality, although this result is statistically significant in only one case. They do not identify any statistically significant difference in the support depressing effect of illegality under the trade regime compared to the human rights regime. (shrink)

FinTech -- along with the blockchain, other distributed ledger, smart contract, and tokenization usually assumed to accompany it -- could change the way governments procure goods and services. Procurement authorities and procurement law can play a vital role in the development of FinTech. They can help build the FinTech platforms and ecosystems that help them engage in public procurement. They should not try to procure such FinTech outright. At the national level, regulators should not just leave FinTech rulemaking up (...) to financial regulators. Contracting authorities should not just develop or use their own selected FinTech applications willy-nilly. They should contribute to overall changes in procurement law - which extend far beyond simple supervisory or regulatory technologies (RegTech/SupTech). Governments should get serious about the Agreement on Government Procurement and similar treaties - by creating a new authority to help develop the law needed to put FinTech-enabled procurement platforms in place. China’s own world-leading FinTech and cross-border public procurements do not always contribute to a global level playing field. Any FinTech applications facilitating public procurement should thus encourage compliance with the procurement law legal principles the international community has developed over decades. (shrink)

This book can be useful for college seniors or graduate students who have studied law to some extent. It also can inspire law professors, business people, Members of the National Assembly, administrative officials, in addition to all intellectuals who suffer from whipping or beating due to an incomprehensible legal structure and mandates relevant with their routine desk work. -/- Chapter 1 of this book examines the essence of existing constitution and international law theories directed to the nature of state (...) power, market and civil democracy in a rapidly developing international society in the age of globalization. Most of discussions had been expended to introduce and survey a new legal perception and its logic of reasoning as a law indebted to the concept of world law theory. Chapter 2 studies the core contents of international law according to the chapter on international law and international relations of the United States. It was spelled out to comply with the explanations and comments incorpated within the 4th edition of the Restatement of the United States. -/- Chapter 3 refers to the legal system characterized as a public law and concerning a regulatory measure over the world market by states. An idealistic class of citizens, who emerged for a capitalist hegemony, generally have a status of sovereign, which came into being as owed to their revolution. However, it is also true that the citizens as an individual or laity are required to obey the regulations of state in the market. The interstate commerce clause of the United States Constitution is generally viewed as being shunned with an intention that state governments' measures to regulate the market should not hinder the prosperity of US market at the federal level. WTO laws known to be the most important international trade law, in fact, have a structure similar to the interstate commerce clause of United States Constitution. In this point of view, scholars gave a name to WTO as the world economic constitutional system. In the same vein, WTO member countries should not hinder the prosperity of a single world market as if the Clause requires pursuing that of a single federal market. Chapter 4 summarizes the core of legal norms, which is purported to study the jurisprudence of global market in coverage of fundamental principles espousing the freedom of contract, laws of sales, contract, documentary letter of credit, basic rule on the agencies of civil law. Therefore, we will be exposed to the laws of United Nations convention on the sales contract (CISG), the United Nations contract law, popularly cllled Principles as well as short introductions for the agency laws and cases relating the civil dispute of documentary L/Cs. -/- I am unfeigned to confess that this book is neither thorough nor complete in terms of the craftsmanship of necessary exhaustiveness. So its contents may insufficiently cover issues or discussions as contrary to the author's purpose. However, I have exerted utmostly to include and cover as much as possible what I think is necessary for readers to grasp new theories and basic principles. I plan to add necessary revisions and supplements as opportunities arise. As a scholar, I always feel cautious and sorry about publishing books. However, the development of global market, civil democracy, and the universal legal system related to them is certainly Darwinistic and an evolutionary joy that can be duly sensed in the field of law. I dare to recommend that readers can enjoy. (shrink)

How should International Political Theory (IPT) relate to public policy? Should theorists aspire for their work to be policy- relevant and, if so, in what sense? When can we legitimately criticize a theory for failing to be relevant to practice? To develop a response to these questions, I will consider two issues: (1) the extent to which international political theorists should be concerned that the norms they articulate are precise enough to entail clear practical advice under different (...) empirical circumstances; (2) whether they should provide concrete practical advice on policy choice and institutional reform. These questions are related but distinct, and we should answer each quite differently. Regarding the first, I shall argue that it counts heavily against a theory if it is not precise enough to guide policy and reform given certain empirical assumptions. On the second, I will argue that theorists should be very cautious when engaging with questions of policy and institutional design. Some principles of IPT can be criticized for being insufficiently precise, but a degree of abstraction from concrete policy recommendations is a virtue, rather than a vice, of an element of IPT. I conclude that we should aim to be precise without being concrete. To help fix ideas and anchor my argument, I will discuss these issues with reference to a principle that John Rawls has advocated in his influential work The Law of Peoples (Rawls 1999a): a duty of assistance to societies that lack the capacity to satisfy the basic needs or protect the basic rights of their people. (shrink)

Does it seem that with each reported state cyberattack, there comes an announcement of discovery, an attribution to one of a handful of usual suspects, some threatening language suggesting imminent retribution, and then nothing more? Increased incidence of cyberattack makes its occurrence seem simultaneously rampant in terms of publicity and minimal in terms of threat of war. If rampant, how can repeated deployment by the same actors carry no punitive consequences? How is such audaciousness tolerated? For some, a cyberattack by (...) a state is an act of war. Its prevalence suggests there must be a void somewhere that facilitates its use without consequence. Others think state cyberattack is like other internet novelties: digital malfeasance, amounting to a nuisance that naturally follows from a digital‐based existence, particularly since non‐state actors are typically involved. Yet, state‐on‐state hostilities are historically perilous on a vast scale, and there is a multilateral system for regulating the use of force in the context of war. Acts of war, even when seeming minimal in impact, are not by‐products of a digital fad, and cyberattack is now described as far more than ‘nuisance’. If anywhere, the place for clarity on hostile state cyberoperations use should be accounted for in International Humanitarian Law. Yet, in its present form, it is ambiguous if not silent on the subject, suggesting that cyberattack currently presents an advantage to perpetrating states. Does this void or these ambiguities make cyberattacks more legally advantageous to states than traditional, kinetic weaponry? I examine whether existing IHL is sufficiently adaptable to state cyberoperations through a mixed legal and theoretical approach and conclude that they do. (shrink)

On 4 December 2006, during discussions on the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill, Andrew Dismore, Member of Parliament and then Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, said, ‘Organisations can kill people … but it is the actions and omissions of people in organisations that cumulatively cause death’. However, the corporate entity is a vehicle for the communal actions of those who guide the business activities. Attempting to seek out persons or people that are solely responsible for deaths (...) and violations of human rights caused by companies is fruitless. The entity is a vehicle for those actions, it possesses its own, often deep, pockets of finance and resources, and it has a public image. It is more useful to punish the corporate entity, in instances where the corporate behaviour has led to death and human rights abuses, as it is in seeking out individual defendants. Soft law options have not brought about a sufficient reduction in instances of deaths caused by corporate behaviour across jurisdictional borders. This article will argue that the time has now come to establish an international hard law on corporate killing, and for states to ensure that there is a viable path towards a redress for victims and their families along with adopting a duty to assist the victim or their family to pursue redress to ensure a fair balance of power against transnational companies. (shrink)

Self-authorship has been established as the basis of an influential liberal principle of legislation and public policy. Being the author of one’s own life is a significant component of one’s own well-being, and therefore is better understood from the viewpoint of the person whose life it is. However, most philosophical accounts, including Raz’s conception of self-authorship, rely on general and abstract principles rather than specific, individual psychological properties of the person whose life it is. We elaborate on the principles (...) of self-authorship on the basis of self-determination theory, an empirically based psychological theory that has been at the forefront of the study of autonomy and self-authorship for more than 45 years. Our account transcends distinctions between positive and negative freedom and attempts to pinpoint the exact properties of self-authorship within the psychological processes of intrinsic motivation and internalization. If a primary objective of public policy is to support self-authorship, then it should be devised on the basis of how intrinsic motivation and internalization can be properly supported. Self-determination theory identifies three basic psychological needs: autonomy, competence, and relatedness. The satisfaction of these needs is associated with the support and growth of intrinsic tendencies and the advancement of well-being. Through this analysis, we can properly evaluate the significance of rationality, basic goods, and the availability of options to self-authorship. Implications for law and policy are discussed with an emphasis on legal paternalism and what many theorists call “liberal perfectionism,” that is, the non-coercive support and promotion of the good life. (shrink)

The relationship between power, law and consent is a key feature of the Western debate on criminal law. On the one side, defining the legitimate ways of exercising the punitive power has been a critical question since the Enlightenment thought onwards and especially as to the rule of law doctrine. On the other side, the role played by public punishment in shaping consent and its communicative potential have been crucial questions for critical, as well as non-critical approaches to criminal (...) law in contemporary thought. These questions gain in strength and radicalism when it comes to international criminal law (ICL). In this case the filter of the state is not present anymore to mediate between power, law and consent, and the power to punish individuals is directly exercised by international institutions. This means, on the one hand, that traditional justifications of the power to punish and which are elaborated on in the domestic sphere are not useful anymore in legitimating international punishment. International criminal norms are not framed by an international democratically elected parliament, and their exercise is not controlled by the complex system of checks and balances typical of the rule of law. On the other hand, having not being created by a sovereign, international criminal law cannot be conceived as an instrument to build or consolidate consent around the sovereign. A double-sided dilemma therefore arises: traditional explanations are no longer apt to answer the question whether ICL is legitimate, while ICL itself can no longer be considered an instrument to build consent around the traditional power exercising it, namely the state. Although I consider both sides of the dilemma equally interesting and stimulating, I will focus here only on one side of the coin: the ability to build consent of the ICL institutions, and in particular the International Criminal Court (ICC). In other words, instead of asking whether the consent around the ICC is broad enough for the Court to be considered legitimate, I shall ask whether the ICC is able to build consent around the world order it embodies. (shrink)

Democratic transitions of Eastern countries brought about the need to shifting from eastern into western paradigms. Transitioning into western models of media, more specifically to the public system of broadcasting became a prerequisite for achieving the EU status for Eastern European transitioning countries. It has been twelve years since Albania entered the process of transformation from being a State TV towards becoming a Public Television. The article aims to provide a theoretical framework of public television networks in (...) western countries pointing to the pertaining relationships with their political systems. Using this methodology, the article evaluates the developmental process of RTSH, and traces the evolution of certain fundamental laws to determine that political elites have not put forth any efforts to reform laws to establish self-regulatory instruments and guarantee the media independence as a self regulated institution. Despite international recommendations and internal pressures for change, the practices in the area of public network television services have served the private interest of political parliamentary forces. Using the Hallin and Mancini comparative models for media, we established that efforts towards reformation, the changes of Albanian public television are not guided towards a liberal democratic model; instead they resemble a Mediterranean or polarized system. Political arbitration in choosing key institutions that ensure self regulation and the direction of public service broadcasting reflects similarities with the Italian model of Lottizzazione.However, the design of hybrid laws whose structures and functions do not serve public interests, but instead ensure the interest of political elites, is not a formula that guarantees public service broadcasting. By choosing to pursue the old trend of TVSH’s broadcasting methods, politics is channeling the future of public service broadcasting towards a polarizing model. The approach that would allow a liberalization of Public Service Broadcasting, demands a political emancipation and consensus on this particular issue. For now, the sings of consensus are nowhere to be seen, and as such the fate of public service broadcasting remains in a pending status. One of the main consequences in this process, remains the under informed public that is a vital element in a viable democracy. In this case, society becomes the victim of an autocratic system, perpetually stuck in a vicious cycle against democratic interest. (shrink)

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse approaches to the sharing economy from the perspective of public policy science. In the first part of the text, attention is paid to perceiving the development of the emerging sharing economy not only as phenomenon with positive economic effects but also as a set of public problems (e.g., on the labour market and for existing economic structures) that require intervention at the level of national governments as well as at (...) class='Hi'>international level. Subsequent sections identify possible actions for regulating the development of the sharing economy. The role of soft law, stakeholders’ networks, self-regulation and standardisation are discussed in the chapter. The summary includes potential directions for further research. (shrink)

This Article defines four distinct conceptions of cruelty found in underdeveloped form in domestic and international criminal law sources. The definition is analytical, focusing on the types of agency, victimization, causality, and values in each conception of cruelty. But no definition of cruelty will do justice to its object until complemented by the kind of understanding practical reason provides of the implications of the phenomenon of cruelty. -/- No one should be neutral in relation to cruelty. Eminently, cruelty in (...) criminal law, a human-created phenomenon, vigorously calls for responses in the form of preventive and corrective action on the part of private and public actors. It is in this sense that cruelty is a problem of practical reason, one of action preoccupied with its legal or moral obligations, rational grounds, value commitments, and actual consequences. -/- However, the connection between conceptions of cruelty and the implications practical reason can draw from the correct application of a conception of cruelty to phenomena in the world remains too detached to be able to capture and explain people's actual experiences both of seeing cruelty in the world and of confronting the question of what to do about cruelty and how to address its cultural and institutional aspects. Something is missing. -/- What is missing is the integration of conceptions of cruelty and the practical reason implications of detecting cruelty in the world into normative models which operate as meaning matrixes for cognition, meaning, and action. This Article undertakes this explanatory task through an exercise of reconstructing seminal philosophical ideas about cruelty. The result is that the four conceptions of cruelty are placed within three distinct normative models, which ultimately render intelligible legal conceptions of cruelty and legal reactions to it. (shrink)

A special issue of the International Journal in Information Science and Engineering “Neutrosophic Sets and Systems” (vol. 71/2024) is dedicated to the Conference on NeutroGeometry, NeutroAlgebra, and Their Applications, organized by the Latin American Association of Neutrosophic Sciences. This event, which took place on August 12-14, 2024, in Havana, Cuba, was made possible by the valuable collaboration of the University of Havana, the University of Physical Culture and Sports Sciences "Manuel Fajardo," the José Antonio Echeverría University of Technology, University (...) of Informatics Sciences and the Cuban Academy of Sciences among other institutions. In 2019 Smarandache generalized the classical Algebraic Structures to NeutroAlgebraic Structures (or NeutroAlgebras) {whose operations and axioms are partially true, partially indeterminate, and partially false} as extensions of Partial Algebra, and to AntiAlgebraic Structures (or AntiAlgebras) {whose operations and axioms are totally false} and on 2020 he continued to develop them. The NeutroAlgebras & AntiAlgebras are a new field of research, which is inspired from our real world. In classical algebraic structures, all operations are 100% well-defined, and all axioms are 100% true, but in real life, in many cases these restrictions are too harsh, since in our world we have things that only partially verify some operations or some laws. Similarly, a classical Geometry structure has all axioms totally (100%) true. A NeutroGeometry structure has some axioms that are only partially true, and no axiom is totally (100%) false. Whereas an AntiGeometry structure has at least one axiom that is totally (100%) false. And in general, in any field of knowledge one has: Structure, NeutroStructure, and AntiStructure which were inspired from our real world where the laws (axioms) do not equally apply to all people and in the same degree. This special issue aims to highlight the most recent advances and applications in the fields of NeutroGeometry and NeutroAlgebra, two areas that are at the forefront of contemporary mathematical and scientific thought. During the conference, the mathematical foundations and practical applications of these disciplines were explored, as well as their relevance in the MultiAlism system and other interdisciplinary areas. The content of this special issue has been carefully selected to reflect the diversity and depth of the topics discussed at the conference. This event and the subsequent publication of these works underline the growing importance of neutrosophic theories in the current scientific landscape. We are confident that the ideas and discoveries shared in these pages will be of great value to researchers, academics, and professionals interested in these innovative areas of knowledge. (shrink)

The ‘convergence conception’ of political liberalism has become increasingly popular in recent years. Steven Wall has shown that convergence liberals face a serious dilemma in responding to disagreement about whether laws are publicly justified. What I call the ‘conjunctive approach’ to such disagreement threatens anarchism, while the ‘non-conjunctive’ approach appears to render convergence liberalism internally inconsistent. This paper defends the non-conjunctive approach, which holds that the correct view of public justification should be followed even if some citizens do not (...) consider enacted laws to be publicly justified. My argument sheds light on the fundamental structure of convergence liberalism. (shrink)

Alexander James Dallas' An Exposition of the Causes and Character of the War was written as part of an effort by the then US government to explain and justify its declaration of war in 1812. However publication coincided with the ratification of the Treaty of Ghent, which ended the War. The Exposition is especially interesting for the insight it provides into the self-constraint of American foreign policy and of the conduct of a war. The focus is on the foreign policy (...) of the early republic and the related philosophy of law and war. A central idea is that international law should chiefly benefit those remaining at peace. -/- Dallas was a Philadelphian who settled there in 1783, the year of the Peace of Paris which ended the War of Independence, arriving from Jamaica after a British education. He wrote much on law, becoming the first recorder of cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. He later served as Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and federal district attorney for Eastern Pennsylvania, appointed by President Jefferson. He was appointed Secretary of Treasury by President Madison. -/- In this edition the original text is presented with annotations to help identify persons and events of interest. The editor has also added an Introduction, a Bibliography, a short Chronology of Dallas' life and the events of the War, and an analytical Index. As such this annotated edition presents a key primary source in a manner helpful to research for students of the early Republic. (shrink)

Many democratic theorists hold that when a decision is collectively made in the right kind of way, in accordance with the right procedure, it is permissible to enforce it. They deny that there are further requirements on the type of reasons that can permissibly be used to justify laws and policies. In this paper, I argue that democratic theorists are mistaken about this. So-called public reason requirements follow from commitments that most of them already hold. Drawing on the democratic (...) ideal of civic equality, I show that it can successfully explain why political decision-making must have the right sort of procedure-independent justification. However, contra standard accounts of public reason, I argue that laws and policies need to be justified with convergence accessible, not shared, reasons. Public reasons are those that are accessible in light of evaluative standards shared by all, or in light of every citizen’s private evaluative standards. Since this will make the set of public reasons wider, it makes the theory more palatable to sceptics while retaining the framework’s justificatory potential. (shrink)

This is review of the book "Rightful Relations with Distant Strangers: Kant, the EU, and the Wider World" by Aravind Ganesh, which discusses the relevance of Immanuel Kant's legal philosophy for the European Union's exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The book explores this issue from the perspectives of public international law and private law theory as well.

AI and the Universal Law of Economic Balance: A Homeostatic Model for Sustainable Prosperity -/- Introduction -/- Modern economies are primarily driven by the profit motive, which, while encouraging innovation and efficiency, often leads to wage stagnation, wealth inequality, and resource exploitation. The imbalance between corporate profits, wages, purchasing power, and market demand has resulted in recurring economic crises, social unrest, and environmental degradation. -/- To resolve these systemic issues, economic policies must align with the universal law of balance in (...) nature, ensuring that financial systems function as self-regulating ecosystems rather than unstable, profit-driven markets. Achieving this balance requires both gradual reform and fundamental restructuring, first at the national level and then integrated into a global economic framework. -/- The key to Implementing and maintaining this balance lies in artificial intelligence (AI), which can analyze economic conditions in real time and adjust wages, prices, taxation, and resource distribution to maintain stability. However, to prevent AI from becoming a tool of economic control for powerful entities, it must be open-source, decentralized, and governed by ethical principles. -/- This essay explores how AI-driven economic balance can replace market-driven instability with a self-regulating, sustainable model that ensures fair wages, stable prices, and equitable wealth distribution. -/- The Problem: Profit Motive and Economic Imbalance -/- The traditional economic system relies on profit margins to sustain businesses. However, when companies focus on maximizing profits, several imbalances emerge: -/- 1. Lower Wages Reduce Purchasing Power -/- When businesses lower costs to remain competitive, wages stagnate. -/- Lower wages mean consumers cannot afford the products they produce. -/- 2. Weaker Demand Forces Businesses to Cut Costs Further -/- If people cannot buy goods, businesses cut jobs and wages further, deepening the problem. -/- Economic growth becomes dependent on debt, leading to financial instability. -/- 3. Wealth Concentration Creates Social and Political Instability -/- Extreme profit accumulation among a small elite leads to economic inequality. -/- Governments either increase taxes (which businesses resist) or cut social services (which leads to public unrest). -/- This cycle of imbalance proves that unregulated profit-seeking is unsustainable. Instead, an economy must be structured to self-regulate, ensuring a balance between wages, prices, profits, and demand. -/- A Homeostatic Economic Model: Balancing Wages, Prices, and Profits -/- A homeostatic economic model ensures that all components of the economy—wages, prices, profit margins, taxation, and demand—adjust dynamically to maintain stability. The following reforms would create this balance: -/- 1. Wage-Price Equilibrium -/- Wages must be indexed to productivity and inflation, ensuring purchasing power remains stable. -/- Profit-sharing incentives should be standardized, allowing workers to benefit from company success. -/- 2. Profit Regulation Without Killing Innovation -/- Essential industries (e.g., healthcare, food, energy) should have profit caps to prevent price exploitation. -/- Businesses that reinvest in worker wages, technology, or sustainability should receive tax breaks. -/- 3. Market Demand and Supply Stability -/- Governments and businesses must collaborate to prevent artificial scarcity and price manipulation. -/- Tax policies should support lower-income groups, ensuring their purchasing power remains intact. -/- 4. Dynamic Feedback Mechanism for Economic Stability -/- Economic decisions must be based on real-time data, avoiding speculation-based policies. -/- Policies should be adjustable based on changes in market conditions, preventing booms and busts. -/- These policies require both national reforms and global cooperation, ensuring that no single country or corporation can disrupt the balance for personal gain. -/- AI as the Key to Homeostatic Economic Balance -/- Maintaining economic balance in real time is too complex for human policymakers alone. This is where artificial intelligence (AI) can play a critical role in: -/- 1. Real-Time Wage and Price Adjustments -/- AI can analyze inflation, productivity, and cost of living to dynamically adjust wages and prices. -/- 2. Profit Optimization Without Exploitation -/- AI can track corporate profits and suggest profit-reinvestment policies that benefit workers and society. -/- 3. Smart Taxation and Wealth Redistribution -/- AI-driven progressive taxation models ensure fair wealth distribution while preventing economic stagnation. -/- 4. Market Demand and Supply Optimization -/- AI can predict consumer demand shifts and help businesses adjust production to prevent shortages or oversupply. -/- 5. Global Trade and Resource Management -/- AI can analyze trade patterns to ensure fair pricing and sustainable resource allocation worldwide. -/- 6. Public Awareness and Education -/- AI can identify economic misconceptions and suggest educational initiatives to promote financial literacy. -/- For AI to function effectively in this role, it must operate under ethical and decentralized governance to serve humanity rather than corporate or political interests. -/- Ensuring AI Remains Open-Source and Decentralized -/- To prevent AI from being misused as a tool of economic control, its development and governance must follow these principles: -/- 1. Open-Source AI for Economic Balance -/- AI models should be transparent and publicly auditable to prevent hidden biases. -/- Developers from multiple disciplines should contribute to ensure fairness and accuracy. -/- 2. Decentralized Governance Model -/- AI should be managed through global economic councils, not a single government or corporation. -/- Blockchain technology can ensure transparency in AI-driven economic decisions. -/- 3. Ethical Safeguards Against Manipulation -/- AI decisions should prioritize sustainability and human well-being over profit. -/- Economic policies should be auditable in real-time by independent researchers and civil organizations. -/- Failsafe mechanisms must prevent AI from implementing harmful policies due to data misinterpretation. -/- By ensuring AI-driven economic balance is open-source, decentralized, and ethically governed, it can create a self-correcting system that prevents economic crises, stabilizes wealth distribution, and ensures long-term prosperity. -/- Implementation Strategy: Gradual Reform Leading to Systemic Change -/- Since economic transition cannot happen overnight, a phased approach is necessary: -/- Phase 1: National-Level Reforms -/- 1. Implement wage-price indexing and profit-sharing policies. -/- 2. Reduce corporate taxes for businesses that reinvest in workers and sustainability. -/- 3. Introduce regulated price stabilization for essential goods. -/- Phase 2: Global Economic Integration -/- 1. Establish international economic councils to guide balance-driven policies. -/- 2. Reform global trade agreements to prioritize fair wages and sustainability. -/- 3. Create a universal economic sustainability index to track progress. -/- Phase 3: AI-Governed Dynamic Economic System -/- 1. Develop real-time AI monitoring for wage-price adjustments. -/- 2. Implement AI-driven smart taxation to prevent wealth inequality. -/- 3. Ensure AI operates under decentralized, transparent governance. -/- Conclusion: The Future of an AI-Driven Balanced Economy -/- By integrating AI with economic policy, we can create a self-regulating economic system that follows the universal law of balance, preventing both extreme poverty and extreme wealth accumulation. This homeostatic economic model ensures that profits, wages, prices, and demand remain in equilibrium, fostering sustainable prosperity for all. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper, I set out some basic elements of a deontic logic with an implementation appropriate for handling conflicting legal obligations for purposes of programming autonomous machine agents. Kantian justice demands that the prescriptive system of enforceable public laws be consistent, yet statutes or case holdings may often describe legal obligations that contradict; moreover, even fundamental constitutional rights may come into conflict. I argue that a deontic logic of the law should not try to work around such conflicts (...) but, instead, identify and expose them so that the rights and duties that generate inconsistencies in public law can be explicitly qualified and the conflicts resolved. I then argue that a credulous, non-monotonic deontic logic can describe inconsistent legal obligations while meeting Kant’s demand for consistency in the prescriptive system of public law. Finally, I propose an implementation of this logic via a modified form of “answer set programming,” which I demonstrate with some simple examples. (shrink)

Could having a sense of humor be a virtue? In this paper, we argue for an affirmative answer to this question. Like other virtues, a sense of humor enhances and inhibits the expression of various emotions, especially amusement, contempt, trust, and hope. Someone possesses a virtuous sense of humor to the extent that they are well-disposed to appropriately enhance or inhibit these emotions in themselves and others through both embodied reactions (e.g., smiling, laughter, eyerolls) and language (e.g., telling jokes, understanding (...) others’ jokes, etc.). Regarding the aims or purposes of a sense of humor, we argue that a sense of humor aids both its bearer and other people who are socially connected to the bearer with coping, connection, capability, and criticism. If this is on the right track, then the value of a sense of humor is pluralistic: a sense of humor doesn’t do just one thing, but several things simultaneously. We then explore four contexts in which a sense of humor is especially needed, namely hardship, social relationships, social and political cooperation, and existential reflection. (shrink)

This article demonstrates a priori cosmopolitan values of restraint and harm limitation exist to establish a cosmopolitan “no-harm” duty in warfare, predating utilitarianism and permeating modern international humanitarian law. In doing so, the author exposes the atemporal and ahistorical nature of utilitarianism which introduces chaos and brutality into the international legal system. Part 2 conceptualises the duty as derived from the “no-harm” principle under international environmental law. Part 3 frames the discussion within legal pluralism and cosmopolitan ethics, (...) arguing that divergent legal jurisdictions without an international authority necessitates a “public international sphere” to mediate differences leading to strong value-commitment norm-creation. One such norm is the “no-harm” duty in warfare. Part 4 traces the duty to the Stoics, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, African traditional culture, Hinduism, and Confucianism. Parts 5 and 6 explain how the duty manifests in principles of distinction and proportionality under international humanitarian law. (shrink)

The philosophical literature on personal relationships is focused on dyads: close relationships between just two people. This paper aims to characterise the value of looser and larger relational networks, particularly from the perspective of liberal political theory. We focus on relational networks' value vis-a-vis the important good of felt security. We begin by characterising felt security and analysing how felt security is produced within dyads. We highlight the ambivalent nature of dyadic relationships as a source of felt security. We then (...) theorise relational networks, explaining how they too can provide felt security. We explore three unappreciated benefits that arise when felt security is garnered from a network, rather than from a dyad. These benefits take liberal political theory as their starting point. We close by considering the implications - for both individual action and institutional design - of using relational networks as a source of felt security. (shrink)

The Universal Formula for Eliminating Government Corruption: A Natural Law-Based Approach -/- Introduction -/- Government corruption is one of the most persistent obstacles to societal progress, leading to economic decline, weakened institutions, and widespread inequality. Traditional anti-corruption measures—such as stricter laws, transparency initiatives, and public awareness campaigns—have failed to fully eliminate corruption because they do not address the problem at a systemic and scientific level. -/- By applying the universal formula, which is based on the universal law of balance (...) in nature, we can understand corruption as a systemic defect—a violation of natural equilibrium that causes inefficiency and societal suffering. This essay will provide a comprehensive scientific explanation of corruption, supported by research, and propose a complete solution that integrates education, institutional reforms, AGI-driven governance, cultural adaptation, and strategic implementation. -/- 1. The Science Behind Corruption: A Systemic Imbalance -/- A. Psychological and Biological Causes → Internal Homeostasis -/- Scientific research suggests that corruption is rooted in human psychology and biology, particularly in: -/- Evolutionary survival instincts – Studies indicate that self-preservation and resource hoarding behaviors evolved to ensure survival but can also lead to greed and corruption in modern societies. (Reference: Trivers, 1971 – Evolutionary theory of reciprocity) -/- Cognitive biases – Research in behavioral psychology shows that self-justification, moral disengagement, and in-group favoritism make individuals rationalize corrupt behavior. (Reference: Bandura, 1999 – Moral disengagement theory) -/- Neurological reward systems – Studies using fMRI scans reveal that bribery activates brain regions associated with pleasure, reinforcing corrupt behaviors. (Reference: Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006 – Neurological basis of unethical behavior) -/- Universal Formula Solution: -/- Educational reprogramming is needed to counteract these internal imbalances. -/- Schools should instill ethical reasoning, self-regulation, and critical thinking from an early age. -/- Leaders must be trained to recognize that corruption leads to long-term systemic instability, disrupting both individual and societal balance. -/- B. Economic Incentives and Systemic Defects → Structural Homeostasis -/- Economists have long observed that corruption is often a rational response to flawed systems where: -/- Low salaries and financial insecurity create incentives for bribery. (Reference: Becker & Stigler, 1974 – Economics of crime and punishment) -/- Weak regulatory oversight allows corruption to persist with minimal consequences. -/- Lack of transparency in financial systems enables embezzlement and fraud. -/- Universal Formula Solution: -/- The economic system must be free of defects—governments should: -/- Ensure fair wages for public officials to reduce bribery incentives. -/- Use blockchain-based transparency systems to track public spending. -/- Implement AI-driven financial audits to detect corruption in real time. -/- C. Political and Institutional Weakness → Governance Homeostasis -/- Corruption thrives when institutions fail to enforce accountability and transparency. -/- The Principal-Agent Problem: Public officials (agents) may act in their own interests rather than serving the public (principals). (Reference: Rose-Ackerman, 1978 – Corruption and governance theory) -/- Legal Loopholes: Weak anti-corruption laws allow elites to manipulate the system. -/- Lack of Whistleblower Protections: Fear of retaliation prevents corruption from being exposed. -/- Universal Formula Solution: -/- Governments must function like biological systems, with constant monitoring and correction mechanisms: -/- Real-time transparency tools (AI-driven monitoring of government transactions). -/- Independent anti-corruption agencies with full enforcement powers. -/- Legal frameworks based on the principle of natural balance, where punishments restore equilibrium rather than being arbitrary. -/- D. Cultural Normalization of Corruption → Collective Homeostasis -/- In some societies, corruption is seen as an accepted norm due to: -/- Patronage networks and nepotism embedded in political cultures. -/- Religious and social justifications for bribery (“gifts” given in exchange for favors). -/- Distrust in the justice system, leading to reliance on informal corruption-based solutions. -/- Universal Formula Solution: -/- A holistic education system must be implemented to reprogram societal attitudes toward corruption. -/- Schools should teach: -/- The universal law of balance and its ethical implications. -/- The cause-and-effect nature of corruption—how even small acts of dishonesty contribute to systemic collapse. -/- Critical thinking skills to challenge corrupt norms and misinformation. -/- 2. Case Studies: Applying the Universal Formula to Real-World Corruption -/- Case Study 1: Singapore’s Zero-Tolerance Approach -/- Singapore successfully reduced corruption by: -/- Increasing public sector salaries to remove bribery incentives. -/- Strict enforcement of anti-corruption laws, ensuring accountability. -/- Cultural reprogramming through education and public campaigns. -/- Universal Formula Connection: Singapore’s model aligns with systemic homeostasis, ensuring a balance between economic incentives, strong institutions, and ethical education. -/- Case Study 2: Scandinavian Countries – Transparency and Trust -/- Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway) maintain low corruption levels through: -/- Public trust in institutions based on long-term systemic balance. -/- High transparency in government spending. -/- Strong legal frameworks with immediate corrective feedback mechanisms. -/- Universal Formula Connection: These countries maintain governance homeostasis, preventing corruption through self-correcting institutional designs. -/- 3. Implementing the Universal Formula to Eliminate Corruption -/- A. Education Reform: The Foundation of Ethical Governance -/- Integrate the universal law of balance into curricula from elementary to higher education. -/- Teach cause-and-effect relationships in governance (e.g., how small bribes lead to systemic collapse). -/- Develop leadership training programs that emphasize ethical decision-making based on natural balance. -/- B. Institutional Reforms: Creating a Self-Correcting System -/- Implement blockchain-based transparency systems for public finance. -/- Strengthen whistleblower protections to ensure safe reporting of corruption. -/- Decentralize power to reduce opportunities for monopolistic corruption. -/- C. AGI-Driven Ethical Governance -/- Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) can be programmed with the universal formula to: -/- Monitor government transactions and detect corruption patterns. -/- Ensure transparent decision-making based on systemic balance. -/- Remove human cognitive biases from governance. -/- D. Cultural Adaptation: Tailoring Solutions to Different Societies -/- In high-corruption societies, initial reforms should focus on education and small wins to shift cultural attitudes. -/- In developing countries, AGI-driven transparency tools can bypass weak institutions. -/- In democratic nations, citizen engagement should be emphasized to create self-regulating governance. -/- --- -/- 4. Addressing Challenges and Counterarguments -/- Objection: “Corruption is inevitable in human nature.” Response: Human nature includes both corruption and ethical reasoning—education determines which dominates. -/- Objection: “Elites will resist systemic reforms.” Response: AGI-driven transparency tools and mass education campaigns can reduce elite control. -/- Objection: “Implementing these changes is unrealistic.” Response: Small-scale pilots in cities or institutions can demonstrate success before national adoption. -/- --- -/- Conclusion: The Universal Formula as the Ultimate Solution to Corruption -/- Corruption is a systemic defect—a violation of the universal law of balance in nature. By applying scientific principles of homeostasis, cause and effect, and feedback regulation, we can create a corruption-free governance model. The universal formula offers the only complete solution, integrating education, institutional reform, AGI-driven oversight, and cultural adaptation. -/- If implemented, this model could lead to a world where governance functions as a perfectly balanced system—free of defects, ethical, and in harmony with natural law. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper, I defend what I call the ‘Inference Principle’. This principle holds that if an agent obtains some information legitimately, then the agent can make any inference she wants based on the information, without violating anyone’s right to privacy. This principle is interesting for at least three reasons. First, it constitutes a novel answer to the timely question of whether the widespread use of ‘data analytics’ to infer personal information about individuals is morally permissible. Second, it contradicts what (...) seems to be a common view of inferences’ ability to violate privacy rights. Third, it offers an account of the theoretically underdeveloped issue of what duties are engendered by the moral right to privacy with regard to inferred information. (shrink)

This paper proposes the notion of evaluative injustice as a distinct kind of injustice. Evaluative injustice occurs when someone is evaluated with regard to whether one satisfies the ideal associated with a social role one occupies, and the evaluation is characterized by an unjust failure of appraisal respect. This kind of injustice is importantly distinct from other kinds of injustice recently theorized, in particular epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007) and ontological injustice (Jenkins 2023). It is distinct insofar as it is how (...) one is evaluated with respect to a given ideal that accounts for the injustice in question. After analyzing the nature of the phenomenon of evaluative injustice (section 2), this paper discusses the multiple different forms it can take (section 3) and argues that the wrong of all instances of evaluative injustice can be understood in terms of appraisal respect (Darwall 1977) (section 4). Throughout, the paper highlights various theoretical benefits the notion of evaluative injustice affords us. (shrink)

There is little more common in ethics than to think pain is intrinsically bad and pleasure is intrinsically good. A Humean-style error theory of the axiology of pain and pleasure is developed against these commonsense claims. We defend the thesis that the value of pain and pleasure is always contingent and only instrumental. We survey prominent theories of both intrinsic value and pain/pleasure, all of which assume that pain and pleasure are intrinsically valuable. We base our error theory on counterexamples (...) to this assumption, upon which these theories falter, and a theory of pain and pleasure which derives their value solely from their evolutionary function. (shrink)

When they are first introduced to the ethical study of humor, students and colleagues alike sometimes react skeptically. They worry that doing ethics about humor is somehow antithetical to the nature of humor, or that it risks impinging on what makes humor valuable. In this paper, I attempt to explore and explain this intuition. I provide an account of humor’s contribution to the good life which helps to explain how and in what sense we might think humor is resistant to (...) ethics. I argue that humor, understood as a sort of play, is resistant to the introduction of practical ethical restrictions, which I call ethical taboos. This is because one of humor’s central contributions to the good life is in relieving us of the burdens of our social, moral, and political obligations. In this way, humor’s value is liberatory. Ethical taboos are exactly the sort of thing we engage in humor to escape, and so they counteract our reasons for engaging in the activity in the first place. I conclude this paper by discussing what some implications might follow from my account on humor ethics more generally. I argue that there may be ways to both preserve the integrity of humorous play and take deal with ethical issues unique to humor. (shrink)

Some scholars working on the ethics of belief argue that we can wrong each other in virtue of what we believe. This thesis is known as doxastic wronging. Proponents of doxastic wronging have different views about when our beliefs wrong. A prominent view is that our beliefs wrong when they falsely diminish. I call this the false diminishment account of doxastic wronging. In this paper, I argue against this account on the grounds that it is morally overdemanding. Nevertheless, I agree (...) with proponents that our beliefs are sometimes morally objectionable. I offer an account of disrespectful belief which holds that our beliefs are disrespectful when they falsely deflate, i.e., incorrectly underestimate, and thereby lead us to undervalue morally significant features of each other’s personhood. My view implies that we can form disrespectful beliefs about each other even if we do not wrong each other by forming them. (shrink)

Over the past decades, the idea that national sovereignty and the authority of the state have been increasingly challenged or even substantially eroded has been a dominant one. Economic globalization advancing a neo-liberal dis-embedding of the economy is seen as the major reason for this erosion. Concerns have increased about the negative consequences for the social fabric of societies, deprived of the strong shock absorption capacity that the welfare states had established in the time of the embedded liberalism to use (...) a term John Ruggie coined. The concerns have also helped nationalistic movements to gain power in many high-income countries, not at least in the United States, calling for putting their economy first. Accordingly, a number of commentators have announced a return of the nation state. In this special issue, we will show that the retreat-of-the-state thesis as well as the return-of-the-state thesis shares the same shortcomings. They conflate state and authority. As a consequence, both theses underestimate important transformations of authority that have taken place since the end of the “short 20TH century,” to use Eric Hobsbawm's periodization. With this special issue, we seek to contribute to a more nuanced analysis of the transformation of authority. The issue is the outcome of a conference that took place at the Copenhagen Business School in 2015, hosted by the research project ‘Institutional Transformation in European Political Economy: A Socio-Legal Approach’ and funded by the European Research Council. (shrink)

With respect to climate change, what is wanted is an account that morally condemns the production of ‘luxury’ greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., joyriding in an SUV), but not ‘subsistence’ emissions (e.g., cooking meals). Now, our individual greenhouse gas emissions either cause harm, or they do not—and those who condemn the production of luxury emissions generally stake their position on the grounds that they do cause harm. Meanwhile, those seeking to defend the moral permissibility of luxury emissions generally do so by (...) arguing that our individual emissions do not cause harm. Here, I argue that, if our individual emissions do cause harm, then this entails too much. For, it entails not only that our luxury emissions are morally impermissible, but that our subsistence emissions are too. This is an undesirable result. Therefore, I propose that we embrace our other option. Namely, I propose that we accept that our individual emissions do not cause harm; or at least, that they make no perceptible difference with respect to the harms associated with climate change. The result of this admission is not as bad as you might think. For, I argue, even if we are individually causally impotent with respect to the harms of climate change, there remains a plausible route toward the moral condemnation of our individual luxury emissions—contrary to what others have argued. What is more, only by accepting our individual causal impotence can we successfully ground the permissibility of our individual subsistence emissions. (shrink)

On 26 January 2021, while announcing that the country had reached the mark of 100,000 deaths within 28 days of COVID-19, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson said that he took “full responsibility for everything that the Government has done” as part of British efforts to tackle the pandemic. The force of this statement was undermined, however, by what followed: -/- What I can tell you is that we truly did everything we could, and continue to do everything that we can, (...) to minimise loss of life and to minimise suffering... -/- Taking these sentiments together, it was hard to avoid the conclusion that the government took responsibility only for doing everything right. Such an admission of responsibility, accommodating no admission of error or wrongdoing, is not really about responsibility at all. Indeed, the UK’s pandemic response has been marked from its earliest days by a shifting of focus from institutional responsibility to personal responsibility for individual UK residents. -/- This paper explores the relationship between these two sites of responsibility—the institutional and the personal—in the context of the sort of pandemic that is ongoing as we write. Section 2 offers some initial definitions and discussions of key terms. Section 3 outlines how these two ideas interact in principle during such emergencies. Section 4 turns to the ‘non-ideal’ implications for personal responsibility of failures of institutional responsibility. While our focus is on the specific context with which we are most familiar, the UK governmental approach, where appropriate we also include examples from other states. (shrink)

This work shows that two problems—the reference class and the mental state of the agent—undermine the plausibility of the ‘blameworthiness tracks risk thesis’ (BTRT), which states, prima facie, an agent is more blameworthy for imposing a greater rather than smaller risk. The article first outlines core concepts. It then shows how the two problems undermine BTRT; namely, (1) no blame attribution based on risk imposition is unequivocal; (2) when the materialization of risk is subject to chance, an agent’s decision can (...) ground an equal degree of blameworthiness regardless of whether the risk is greater or lesser. (shrink)

Cases of akratic behavior are generally seen as paradigmatic depictions of the knowledge-action gap (Darnell et al 2019): we know what we should do, we judge that we should do it, yet we often fail to act according to our knowledge. In recent decades attention has been given to a particular instance of akratic behavior, which is that of “inverse akrasia”, where the agent possesses faulty moral knowledge but fails to act accordingly, thus ending up doing the right thing. In (...) particular, two literary examples are considered as exemplifying this kind of akratic situation: Huckleberry Finn (Arpaly & Schroeder 1999, Arpaly 2000, Hursthouse 1999, Kleist 2009, Holton manuscript) and Neoptolemus as understood by Aristotle (NE; Arpaly & Schroeder 1999). In this paper I will argue that those of Neoptolemus and Huck Finn are not cases of inverse akrasia (Holton manuscript) but are much better explained as instances of what Williams (1993) called “moral incapacity”. In particular, the reason why they fail to act according to their original judgments is due to a lack of motivation to act accordingly, which is grounded in their moral self-identities (Blasi 1984; Vigani 2016). The paper will unfold as follows: I will, first, argue that neither Neoptolemus nor Huck Finn show akratic behavior; thus, they cannot be legitimately labeled as “inverse akratics” (par 1.); then, I will argue that they act the way they do notwithstanding their faulty judgments because they are effectively motivated to do so. Such motivation originates in their moral self-identities and is experienced through the threat of self-betrayal (par 2); finally, I will argue that when an agent is motivated to act in a way that is integral with her moral self-identity, acting otherwise is experienced as something one cannot ultimately do; that is, as a moral incapacity (par 3). This “cannot” is neither a metaphor for an “I shouldn’t”, nor an instance of what has been recently labeled a “moral impossibility” (Caprioglio Panizza 2020, 2021), since it does not arise from the normative force of deontic judgments, and it is neither physically nor psychologically impossible for the agent to act otherwise. (shrink)

Recent divine command theorists make a serious and impressive case that a sophisticated divine command theory has significant metaethical advantages and can adequately meet traditional objections, such as the Euthyphro problem. I survey the attempt sympathetically with a view to explaining how the divine command theory can deal with traditional objections while delivering on metaethical desiderata, such as providing an account of ethical objectivity. I argue, however, that to the extent that a divine command theory succeeds, an ideal observer theory (...) can do equally well. Once the divine command theory is rendered immune to Euthyphro-related objections, we will have all the machinery needed to show that an ideal observer theory can provide the same metaethical advantages, without supposing the existence of a divine commander. Other things being equal, ontological simplicity favors the ideal observer theory. (shrink)

Imagine a moral agent with the native capacity to act rightly in every kind of circumstance. She will never, that is, find herself thrust into conditions she isn’t equipped to handle. Relationships turned tricky, evolving challenges of parenthood, or living in the midst of a global pandemic—she is never mistaken about what must be done, nor does she lack the skills to do it. When we are thrust into a new kind of circumstance, by contrast, we often need time to (...) practice discernment, new forms of compassion, different kinds of courage, or whatever else conditions call for. Unfortunately, such practice usually takes the form of on-the-job training—it is hard to cultivate the skills of an excellent parent, for example, until we actually are parents. Even more unfortunately, on-the-job training basically guarantees mistakes. This paper focuses on errors that (a) cause harm to others, and that (b) we make non-culpably because our skills are (understandably) not yet up to snuff. It argues that agent regret—the attitude singled out for non-culpable failures by much moral philosophy—is inapt in such cases. Rather, we need an attitude I will call stoic determination. (shrink)

In lieu of Abstract: With inequality of various sorts ballooning worldwide, a critique of democracy has come of age, and a change of political ethos is underway. Against this background, the critique of democracy becomes not only possible but also popular, and examples in China and many Western democracies abound. It is no exaggeration to say, in this context, that sufficient momentum has gathered to qualify the situation as "democratic recession," despite people may have different understandings as to the exact (...) nature of this recession and how long it will last. Accompanying this recession, Confucian political meritocracy, whose aim is to correct the wrongs of democracy, is constructed as an alternative to liberal democracy. Many argue that the end of history is not nigh but will continue in and by Confucian political meritocracy... (shrink)

In moral and political philosophy, topics like the distributive inequities conferred via special partial relationships – family relationships, for example – have been frequently debated. However, the epistemic dimensions of such partiality are seldom discussed in the ethical context, and the topic of partial relationships rarely feature in the realm of social epistemology. My view is that the role of partial relationships is worth exploring to enrich our understanding of epistemic injustice and its transmission. I claim that epistemic features typical (...) of partial relationships make phenomena like epistemic injustice easier to mask, more difficult to identify, and harder to correct. (shrink)

Kopeikin (forthcoming a, forthcoming b) and Rachels’ (1975) bare-difference cases elicit the intuition that killing is no different than letting die. Hill’s (2018) bare-difference cases elicit the intuition that killing is worse than letting die. At least one of the intuitions must be mistaken. This calls for an error theory. Hill has an error theory for the intuition elicited by the Kopeikin/Rachels’ cases. Kopeikin and Rachels have an error theory for the intuition elicited by Hill’s cases. A natural thought is (...) that we are at an impasse. There is no plausible basis for preferring one error theory to the other. I argue that this natural thought is mistaken. Not all error theories are equal. Preliminary considerations favor Hill’s error theory and disfavor the Kopeikin/Rachels error theory. But preliminary considerations are not decisive. The way forward in the bare-difference debate is not to evaluate intuitions. The intuitions are in. What is left to do now is evaluate the comparative status of the Hill and the Kopeikin/Rachels error theories. (shrink)

There is a well-established project in moral philosophy which seeks to demarcate deontological normative theories from consequentialist normative theories by defining deontology and deontological restrictions exclusively in terms of their agent-relativity. My aim in this paper is to explain why this project is mistaken and to defend both the possibility and the plausibility of agent-neutral deontological restrictions. I will argue that the common rationale underwriting the alleged agent-relativity of deontological restrictions is not, in fact, deontological at all. If deontological restrictions (...) (qua prohibitions on the performance of particular action-types by particular agents) are to be agent-relative restrictions in the sense that they are grounded in the idea that agents have a special responsibility not to violate them themselves – qua authors of their own actions – then these agent-relative restrictions are best understood as agent-relative consequentialist restrictions. Genuinely deontological restrictions, on the other hand, are agent-neutral restrictions in the sense that they apply to anyone and everyone and are grounded in the inviolable status of those victimised. (shrink)

STRESZCZENIE Opracowanie zmierza do udzielenia odpowiedzi na pytanie, czym – z punktu widzenia struktury procesu wykładni i struktury wchodzących w grę wartości konstytucyjnych – różni się ograniczanie wolności i praw w ramach stosowania „zwykłych środków konstytucyjnych”, od ograniczania wolności i praw dopuszczalnego w stanach nadzwyczajnych. Podjęta zostaje problematyka dotyczącą kwestii materialnych, a poza zakresem rozważanych zagadnień pozostają kwestie dotyczące formalnych warunków dopuszczalności ograniczeń, jak publiczne ogłoszenie zagrożenia czy możliwość wprowadzania ograniczeń w aktach podustawowych. Stawiane tezy są polemiczne wobec poglądów, że (...) zawieszenie wolności lub praw jest skrajnym typem ograniczania i następuje wtedy, gdy wolności czy prawa „już nie ma”, lub że zawieszenie zakłada ograniczenie istoty wolności lub prawa. Okazuje się, że można sensownie mówić o zawieszaniu wolności lub praw także wówczas, gdy są one ograniczane w niewielkim tylko stopniu. Ponadto, możliwe jest zawieszanie, które nie prowadzi do ograniczenia istoty wolności lub prawa. Argumentuje się, że istotą zawieszania wolności lub praw w stanach nadzwyczajnych jest zakwestionowanie podstawowego ich przymiotu, jakim jest – uznawana w prawie międzynarodowym – nienaruszalność „całych” poszczególnych praw człowieka, która jest czymś innym od nienaruszalności ich istoty. Przy okazji prowadzona jest refleksja teoretycznoprawna nad zagadnieniem zawieszania wolności lub praw. Zawieszenie okazuje się czymś istotnie różnym od czasowej utraty mocy obowiązującej przepisów dotyczących wolności czy praw. Ich ciągłe obowiązywanie znajduje wyraz, na przykład, w zasadzie proporcjonalności mającej zastosowanie do zawieszanych wolności lub praw. -/- Extraordinary Measures and Restrictions of Constitutional Freedoms and Rights ABSTRACT The study aims to answer the question on the difference between limitation of freedoms and rights in ordinary situations and their suspension (derogation) when extraordinary measures are introduced. This question is considered from the point of view of the structure of the interpretation process and the structure of the constitutional values. Consideration is given to issues relating to material aspects. However, issues relating to formal conditions for the admissibility of restrictions, such as public announcement of a threat or the possibility of introducing restrictions in sub-statutory acts, are not examined. The theses put forward are critical of the view that suspension of freedoms or rights is an extreme type of limitation and a freedom or a right "is no longer there", and of the view that suspension presupposes violation of the essence of freedom or right. It can be argued that it makes sense to talk about the suspension of freedoms or rights also when they are only slightly restricted. Moreover, it is possible to suspend a freedom or a right without violating their essence. It is argued that suspension of freedoms or rights leads to questioning of their basic characteristic that is their inviolability as recognized in international law. However, this inviolability of freedoms or rights is something different from the inviolability of their essence. In terms of the theory of law, the suspension of freedoms or rights turns out to be something significantly different from the temporary loss of the binding force of the respective provisions. Their continued validity is reflected, for example, in the application of the principle of proportionality to the suspended freedoms or rights. (shrink)

Relational egalitarians differ from distributive egalitarians by focusing on the structure of social relationships—a just society is one in which citizens relate as equals. While we can relate (un)equally along different dimensions, the importance of relating as aesthetic equals has been underexplored. Here, I offer an account of aesthetic equality in relational egalitarian terms. I argue that, to relate as aesthetic equals, individuals must be subject to the same basic normative aesthetic rules, not be stigmatized or feel inferior because of (...) their aesthetic standing, and not suffer certain material harms because of their aesthetic standing. Thus, a society of aesthetic equals would not have oppressive beauty norms. It would also address discrimination against the aesthetically disadvantaged, or lookism. The distinctly relational egalitarian conception of aesthetic equality considered here provides a novel framework for distinguishing between permissible and unjust inequalities of bodily beauty. The relational approach also reveals that while redistribution may not be sufficient to fully address lookism, aesthetic equality can be achieved without radical revision or total rejection of our current conception of beauty. (shrink)

In his monograph *Happiness for Humans*, Daniel C. Russell argues that someone’s happiness is constituted by her virtuous engagement in a certain special sort of activity, which he calls *embodied activity*. An embodied activity is one which depends for its identity on things which lie outside of the agent’s control. What this means is that whether or not it is possible for the activity to continue is not completely up to the agent. A motivating example is my activity of living (...) alongside my spouse. Whether or not it is possible for this activity to continue is not entirely within my control, because my spouse might die, or otherwise become unavailable to me. To defend the view that it’s embodied activities which are constitutive of happiness, Russell defends what he calls the *embodied conception* of the self. This is the view that the boundaries of the self whose happiness is at stake include all the constitutive parts of our embodied activities. In response, I provide two arguments. Firstly, I show that while Russell makes a good case for the relevance of embodied *activities* to happiness, he doesn’t establish that we must adopt the embodied conception of the *self* in order to obtain those insights. Secondly, I argue that to draw the boundaries of the self in accordance with the embodied conception involves forming beliefs in a way that is not epistemically responsible. In making this argument I rely on the claim that there is a strong, particular sense in which other people are unknowable to us, a claim which is developed in the fiction of Haruki Murakami. (shrink)

Wars are large-scale conflicts between organized groups of belligerents, which involve suffering, devastation, and brutality unlike almost anything else in human experience. Whatever one’s other beliefs about morality, all should agree that the horrors of war are all but unconscionable, and that warfare can be justified only if we have some compel- ling account of what is worth fighting for, which can justify contributing, as individu- als and as groups, to this calamitous endeavour. Although this question should obviously be central (...) to both philosophical and politi- cal discussion about war, it is at the forefront of neither. In recent years, philosophical discussion of warfare has bloomed, but the debate has focused on whom we may kill, on the assumption that our aims are justified.1 Political debate, meanwhile, is more concerned with matters of prudence, international law, and public justification, than with reassessing what is worth fighting for. For wars of intervention to halt or prevent massive humanitarian crises, this gap is not so troubling. When warfare is the only means to prevent the mass killing or enslavement of the innocent, the purposes of military force are clear enough (though undoubtedly many other problems remain). The problem is more pressing, how- ever, for the justification of national defence.3 Although common-sense morality and international law view national defence as the paradigm case of justified warfare, grounding this consensus is surprisingly difficult.4 We typically believe that any state is justified in using lethal force to protect its territory against any form of uninvited military incursion by any other state. And yet we lack a good argument to explain why this should be so. In this chapter, I explain why one familiar and otherwise plausible approach to the justification of killing in war cannot adequately ground common-sense views of permissible national defence.5 Reductionists believe that justified warfare reduces to an aggregation of acts that are justified under ordinary principles of interpersonal morality.6 The standard form of reductionism focuses on the principles governing killing in ordinary life, specifically those that justify intentional killing in self- and other-defence, and unintended but foreseen (for short, collateral) killing as a lesser evil. Justified warfare, on this view, is no more than the coextension of multiple acts justified under these two principles. Reductionism is the default philosophical approach to thinking through the ethics of killing in war. It makes perfect sense to ask what principles govern permissible kill- ing in general, before applying them to the particular context of war. If it cannot deliver a plausible set of conclusions about when national defence is permitted, then we must either revise our beliefs about which conclusions count as plausible, or else face the significant challenge of developing a different theoretical model for justifying war- fare—an exceptionalist model, which views war as an exception to the regular moral landscape, to which principles apply which apply to nothing else but war.7 We must show, in other words, that there is something worth fighting for in wars of national defence, which is not engaged when we use force in any other context. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 sets out the argument against reduc- tionism.8 Section 2.3 considers and rebuts one common response to the argument, which has often been thought sufficient grounds to disregard its conclusion. Section 2.4 then asks whether a modified reductionism would survive unscathed by the argu- ment. Finally, section 2.5 sets out some desiderata on a plausible exceptionalist alterna- tive. Section 2.6 concludes. (shrink)

In the concept of European citizenship, public and international law intersect. The unity of the European polity results from the interplay between national and European loyalties. Citizens’ allegiance to the European polity depends on how much they see the polity’s identity as theirs. Foundational ideals that shaped the European project’s identity included social reconciliation and peaceful coexistence, economic reconstruction and widespread prosperity, and the creation of supranational structures to rein in nationalism. A broad cultural consensus underlay the first (...) impulse for integration. Europeans had little trouble giving explicit or tacit allegiance to such a project, which resulted in an unparalleled success. However, roughly 60 years and 20 Member States later, social integration is being challenged as immigrants with diverse cultural backgrounds arrive, while far-right political parties surge in reaction; economic integration is confronted with a faltering euro and countries struggling to meet financial commitments; and political integration weakens as the EU seems to fail the democratic test. Cultural assumptions are no longer shared by all. Allegiance to today’s EU is problematic for the ordinary European citizen. This paper submits that careful attention to the spirit of the foundational ideals sheds light on how the present problems as well as future integration could and should be approached. (shrink)

The separation of powers principle deeply heritaged in the US constitutionalism affected and continues to influence the law and public policy in the nation. The tripartite scheme of government was quarreled over the history how we have to perceive any best adequate interaction among the Congress, Executive and Judiciary. The Constitution itself merely quibbles on this point, and the Supreme Court justices, in some cases, would not be done as a clear cut for the scope of constitutional power conferred (...) on each branch. As the stare decisis is a rule in the common law countries, it is less prospective to anticipate that a quantum leap can be made for the new paradigm of constitutional government in the US. In this challenge, the paper deals with the sensitive area of three powers involving the issue of presidential privilege and immunity, justiceability and standing, as well as judicial control of public agencies. In the course of discussion, several landmark cases were illustrated to make a point for the angulated controversies, typically involving the pressing pubic issues and officers of absolute or qualified immunity. Given the diverse structure of government, the US model had been followed by many new born republics in 20th centuries. The author would wish that the paper provides a comparative lesson for the circle of those countries. (shrink)