A Faithful Response to Disagreement

The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226 (2021)
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In the peer disagreement debate, three intuitively attractive claims seem to conflict: there is disagreement among peers on many important matters; peer disagreement is a serious challenge to one’s own opinion; and yet one should be able to maintain one’s opinion on important matters. I show that contrary to initial appearances, we can accept all three of these claims. Disagreement significantly shifts the balance of the evidence; but with respect to certain kinds of claims, one should nonetheless retain one’s beliefs. And one should retain them even though these beliefs would not be supported by the new total evidence if one didn’t already hold them.

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Lara Buchak
Princeton University


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