Belief through Thick and Thin

Noûs 49 (4):748-775 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX


We distinguish between two categories of belief—thin belief and thick belief—and provide evidence that they approximate genuinely distinct categories within folk psychology. We use the distinction to make informative predictions about how laypeople view the relationship between knowledge and belief. More specifically, we show that if the distinction is genuine, then we can make sense of otherwise extremely puzzling recent experimental findings on the entailment thesis (i.e. the widely held philosophical thesis that knowledge entails belief). We also suggest that the distinction can be applied to debates in the philosophy of mind and metaethics.

Author Profiles

David Rose
Stanford University
John Turri
University of Waterloo
Wesley Buckwalter
George Mason University


Added to PP

743 (#13,211)

6 months
69 (#25,300)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?