Can it be Rational to have Faith?

In Jake Chandler & Victoria Harrison (eds.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press. pp. 225 (2012)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper provides an account of what it is to have faith in a proposition p, in both religious and mundane contexts. It is argued that faith in p doesn’t require adopting a degree of belief that isn’t supported by one’s evidence but rather it requires terminating one’s search for further evidence and acting on the supposition that p. It is then shown, by responding to a formal result due to I.J. Good, that doing so can be rational in a number of circumstances. If expected utility theory is the correct account of practical rationality, then having faith can be both epistemically and practically rational if the costs associated with gathering further evidence or postponing the decision are high. If a more permissive framework is adopted, then having faith can be rational even when there are no costs associated with gathering further evidence
Keywords
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BUCCIB-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2013-09-14
View other versions
Added to PP index
2011-06-21

Total views
6,026 ( #243 of 56,905 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
611 ( #443 of 56,905 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.