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  1. added 2019-05-23
    Scepticisme, apraxia et rationalité.Diego E. Machuca - 2019 - In Diego E. Machuca & Stéphane Marchand (eds.), Les raisons du doute: études sur le scepticisme antique. Paris: Classiques Garnier. pp. 53-87.
    La présente étude a deux objectifs. Le premier est d’examiner les différentes formulations de l’objection de l’ἀπραξία telle qu’elle fut soulevée contre le scepticisme académicien et le pyrrhonisme, ainsi que les réponses à cette objection proposées par Arcésilas et Sextus Empiricus. Le second objectif consiste à évaluer la force de la version de l’objection de l’ἀπραξία selon laquelle le sceptique ne peut réaliser les actions rationnelles propres à l’être humain.
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  2. added 2019-05-10
    Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure.Daniel Fogal - forthcoming - Mind.
    There are at least two threads in our thought and talk about rationality, both practical and theoretical. In one sense, to be rational is to respond correctly to the reasons one has. Call this substantive rationality. In another sense, to be rational is to be coherent, or to have the right structural relations hold between one’s mental states, independently of whether those attitudes are justified. Call this structural rationality. According to the standard view, structural rationality is associated with a distinctive (...)
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  3. added 2019-05-08
    Homo Oeconomicus.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 1998 - In Heinz Kurz & Neri Salvadori (eds.), The Elgar Companion to Classical Economics. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. pp. 377-381.
    A brief reconstruction of the birth, rise and ironical destiny of an almost universal expansion to other disciplines going with a dissolution within the original birthplace of the conception of an economic man, a male-only abstraction forgetful of its own abstract character.
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  4. added 2019-04-24
    The Malthus-Ricardo Correspondence: Sequential Structure, Argumentative Patterns, and Rationality.Marcelo Dascal & Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 1999 - Journal of Pragmatics 31 (9):1129-1172.
    Although the controversy between Malthus and Ricardo has long been considered to be an important source for the history of economic thought, it has hardly been the object of a careful study qua controversy, i.e. as a polemical dialogical exchange. We have undertaken to fill this gap, within the framework of a more ambitious project that places controversies at the center of an account of the history of ideas, in science and elsewhere. It is our contention that the dialogical co-text (...)
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  5. added 2019-04-03
    Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - forthcoming - In Clayton Littlejohn & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (eds.), The Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Evidence. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-13.
    Permissivism is the thesis that, for some body of evidence and a proposition p, there is more than one rational doxastic attitude any agent with that evidence can take toward p. Proponents of uniqueness deny permissivism, maintaining that every body of evidence always determines a single rational doxastic attitude. In this paper, we explore the debate between permissivism and uniqueness about evidence, outlining some of the major arguments on each side. We then consider how permissivism can be understood as an (...)
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  6. added 2019-03-29
    Rational Analysis, Intractability, and the Prospects of ‘as If’-Explanations.Iris Rooij, Cory Wright, Johan Kwisthout & Todd Wareham - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):491–510.
    The plausibility of so-called ‘rational explanations’ in cognitive science is often contested on the grounds of computational intractability. Some have argued that intractability is a pseudoproblem, however, because cognizers do not actually perform the rational calculations posited by rational models; rather, they only behave as if they do. Whether or not the problem of intractability is dissolved by this gambit critically depends, inter alia, on the semantics of the ‘as if’ connective. First, this paper examines the five most sensible explications (...)
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  7. added 2019-03-13
    Do Philosophers Love Wisdom?Nicholas Maxwell - 2003 - The Philosophers' Magazine 22:22-24.
    An academic enterprise that sought to promote human welfare rationally would give intellectual priority to tackling problems of living, including global problems, and would take the basic aim to be to seek and promote wisdom. Universities today, devoted to the pursuit of knowledge - insofar as they are not devoted to money - when judged from the standpoint of promoting human welfare, betray reason, and as a result betray humanity. Why? Because a bad philosophy of inquiry is built into the (...)
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  8. added 2019-03-13
    Is Science Neurotic?Nicholas Maxwell - 2002 - Philosophy Now 51:30-33.
    Neurosis can be interpreted as a methodological condition which any aim-pursuing entity can suffer from. If such an entity pursues a problematic aim B, represents to itself that it is pursuing a different aim C, and as a result fails to solve the problems associated with B which, if solved, would lead to the pursuit of aim A, then the entity may be said to be "rationalistically neurotic". Natural science is neurotic in this sense in so far as a basic (...)
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  9. added 2019-03-04
    Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    Belief is a familiar attitude: taking something to be the case or regarding it as true. But we are more confident in some of our beliefs than in others. For this reason, many epistemologists appeal to a second attitude, called credence, similar to a degree of confidence. This raises the question: how do belief and credence relate to each other? On a belief-first view, beliefs are more fundamental and credences are a species of beliefs, e.g. beliefs about probabilities. On a (...)
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  10. added 2018-12-12
    How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Belief-credence dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences and neither attitude is reducible to the other. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that stakes alone can affect the epistemic rationality of states like knowledge or justified belief. In this paper, I argue that dualism offers a unique explanation of pragmatic encroachment cases. First, I explain pragmatic encroachment and what motivates it. Then, I explain dualism and outline a particular argument for dualism. Finally, I show how dualism can (...)
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  11. added 2018-11-28
    Epistemic Teleology: Synchronic and Diachronic.Ralph Wedgwood - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 85-112.
    According to a widely held view of the matter, whenever we assess beliefs as ‘rational’ or ‘justified’, we are making normative judgements about those beliefs. In this discussion, I shall simply assume, for the sake of argument, that this view is correct. My goal here is to explore a particular approach to understanding the basic principles that explain which of these normative judgements are true. Specifically, this approach is based on the assumption that all such normative principles are grounded in (...)
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  12. added 2018-11-22
    Philosophical Equilibrism, Rationality, and the Commitment Challenge.Michele Palmira - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (3):377-385.
    Helen Beebee (2018) defends a view of the aims of philosophy she calls ‘equilibrism’. Equilibrism denies that philosophy aims at knowledge and maintains that the collective aim of philosophy is ‘to find what equilibria there are that can withstand examination’ (Beebee 2018, p. 3). In this note, I probe equilibrism by focusing on how disagreement challenges our doxastic commitment to our own philosophical theories. Call this the Commitment Challenge. I argue that the Commitment Challenge comes in three varieties and that (...)
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  13. added 2018-09-19
    The Explanatory Role of Consistency Requirements.Marc-Kevin Daoust - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    Is epistemic inconsistency a mere symptom of having violated other requirements of rationality—notably, reasons-responsiveness requirements? Or is inconsistency irrational on its own? This question has important implications for the debate on the normativity of epistemic rationality. In this paper, I defend a new account of the explanatory role of the requirement of epistemic consistency. Roughly, I will argue that, in cases where an epistemically rational agent is permitted to believe P and also permitted to disbelieve P, the consistency requirement plays (...)
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  14. added 2018-09-17
    Permissivism and the Value of Rationality A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis.Miriam Schoenfield - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    In recent years, permissivism—the claim that a body of evidence can rationalize more than one response—has enjoyed somewhat of a revival. But it is once again being threatened, this time by a host of new and interesting arguments that, at their core, are challenging the permissivist to explain why rationality matters. A version of the challenge that I am especially interested in is this: if permissivism is true, why should we expect the rational credences to be more accurate than the (...)
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  15. added 2018-09-07
    The Importance of Rationality.G. Owen Schaefer - 2013 - Hastings Center Report 43 (1):3.
    Michael Hauskeller (“Reflections from a Troubled Stream: Giubliani and Minerva on ‘After-Birth Abortion’) has recently suggested that we should resist rationalist tendencies in moral discourse: “[I]s not all morality ultimately irrational? Even the most strongly held moral convictions can be shown to lack a rational basis.” (Hauskeller 2012, p. 18) Hauskeller was responding to Alberto Giubliani and Francesca Minverva’s (2012) recent defense of the permissibility of killing infants, but his anti-rationality arguments have wide-reaching implications. Yet pace Hauskeller, rationality is indeed (...)
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  16. added 2018-08-04
    Val Dusek' Philosophy of Technology (Arabic Translation of the Introduction and Chapters III and IV) فلسفة التكنولوجيا - فال دوسيك (المقدمة والفصلين الثالث والرابع) - ترجمة وتعليق.Salah Osman - manuscript
    فلسفة التكنولوجيا - فال دوسيك (المقدمة والفصلين الثالث والرابع) - ترجمة وتعليق، في إطار مشروع لترجمة الكتاب بالكامل بالاشتراك مع آخرين.
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  17. added 2018-07-15
    A Response to Prelec.Luc Bovens - 2013 - In Adam Oliver (ed.), Essays in Behavioural Public Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 228-33.
    At the heart of Drazen Prelec’s chapter is the distinction between outcome utility and diagnostic utility. There is a particular distinction in the literature on causal networks (Pearl 2000), namely the distinction between observing and intervening, that maps onto Prelec’s distinction between diagnostic and outcome utility. I will explore the connection between both frameworks.
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  18. added 2018-07-13
    Selection Under Uncertainty: Affirmative Action at Shortlisting Stage.Luc Bovens - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):421-437.
    Choice often proceeds in two stages: We construct a shortlist on the basis of limited and uncertain information about the options and then reduce this uncertainty by examining the shortlist in greater detail. The goal is to do well when making a final choice from the option set. I argue that we cannot realise this goal by constructing a ranking over the options at shortlisting stage which determines of each option whether it is more or less worthy of being included (...)
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  19. added 2018-06-04
    Sleeping Beauty: Exploring a Neglected Solution.Laureano Luna - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    The strong law of large numbers and considerations concerning additional information strongly suggest that Beauty upon awakening has probability 1⁄3 to be in a heads-awakening but should still believe the probability that the coin landed heads in the Sunday toss to be 1⁄2. The problem is that she is in a heads-awakening if and only if the coin landed heads. So, how can she rationally assign different probabilities or credences to propositions she knows imply each other? This is the problem (...)
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  20. added 2018-06-01
    The Scandal of the Irrationality of Academia.Nicholas Maxwell - forthcoming - Philosophy and Theory in Higher Education 1.
    Academic inquiry, in devoting itself primarily to the pursuit of knowledge, is profoundly and damagingly irrational, in a wholesale, structural fashion, when judged from the standpoint of helping to promote human welfare. Judged from this standpoint, academic inquiry devoted to the pursuit of knowledge violates three of the four most elementary rules of rational problem-solving conceivable. Above all, it fails to give intellectual priority to the tasks of (1) articulating problems of living, including global problems, and (2) proposing and critically (...)
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  21. added 2018-04-25
    The Nature and Rationality of Faith.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Joshua Rasmussen & Kevin Vallier (eds.), The New Theists. New York: Routledge.
    A popular objection to theistic commitment involves the idea that faith is irrational. Specifically, some seem to put forth something like the following argument: (P1) Everyone (or almost everyone) who has faith is epistemically irrational, (P2) All theistic believers have faith, thus (C) All (or most) theistic believers are epistemically irrational. In this paper, I argue that this line of reasoning fails. I do so by considering a number of candidates for what faith might be. I argue that, for each (...)
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  22. added 2018-03-21
    On the Scope, Jurisdiction, and Application of Rationality and the Law.Daniel Fogal - 2018 - Problema 12:21-57.
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  23. added 2018-03-19
    Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Reasons.Marc-Kevin Daoust - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.
    It seems that epistemically rational agents should avoid incoherent combinations of beliefs and should respond correctly to their epistemic reasons. However, some situations seem to indicate that such requirements cannot be simultaneously satisfied. In such contexts, assuming that there is no unsolvable dilemma of epistemic rationality, either (i) it could be rational that one’s higher-order attitudes do not align with one’s first-order attitudes or (ii) requirements such as responding correctly to epistemic reasons that agents have are not genuine rationality requirements. (...)
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  24. added 2018-03-08
    Can Worsnip’s Strategy Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Apparent Evidence?Paul Silva - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-13.
    It's plausible to think that we're rationally required to follow our total evidence. It's also plausible to think that there are coherence requirements on rationality. It's also plausible to think that higher-order evidence can be misleading. Several epistemologists have recognized the puzzle these claims generate, and the puzzle seems to have only startling and unattractive solutions that involve the rejection of intuitive principles. Yet Alex Worsnip (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming) has recently argued that this puzzle has a tidy, attractive, (...)
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  25. added 2018-02-17
    Global Philosophy: What Philosophy Ought to Be.Nicholas Maxwell - 2014 - Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic.
    These essays are about education, learning, rational inquiry, philosophy, science studies, problem solving, academic inquiry, global problems, wisdom and, above all, the urgent need for an academic revolution. Despite this range and diversity of topics, there is a common underlying theme. Education ought to be devoted, much more than it is, to the exploration real-life, open problems; it ought not to be restricted to learning up solutions to already solved problems - especially if nothing is said about the problems that (...)
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  26. added 2017-10-07
    The Crisis of Intelligibility in Physics and the Prospects of a New Form of Scientific Rationality.Paavo Pylkkänen - 2017 - In Ilkka Niiniluoto & Thomas Wallgren (eds.), On the Human Condition: Philosophical Essays in Honour of the Centennial Anniversary of Georg Henrik von Wright. Acta Philosophica Fennica vol 93. Helsinki: The Philosophical Society of Finland.
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  27. added 2017-09-21
    Justified Group Belief Is Evidentially Responsible Group Belief.Paul Silva - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.
    What conditions must be satisfied if a group is to count as having a justified belief? Jennifer Lackey (2016 Phil Review) has recently argued that any adequate account of group justification must be sensitive (in certain ways) to both the evidence actually possessed by enough of a group’s operative members as well as the evidence those members should have possessed. I first draw attention to a range of objections to Lackey’s specific view of group justification and a range of concrete (...)
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  28. added 2017-09-18
    Explaining Enkratic Asymmetries: Knowledge-First Style.Paul Silva - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2907-2930.
    There are two different kinds of enkratic principles for belief: evidential enkratic principles and normative enkratic principles. It’s frequently taken for granted that there’s not an important difference between them. But evidential enkratic principles are undermined by considerations that gain no traction at all against their normative counterparts. The idea that such an asymmetry exists between evidential and normative enkratic principles is surprising all on its own. It is also something that calls out for explanation. Similarly, the considerations that undermine (...)
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  29. added 2017-06-15
    Entimemas y la tortuga de Carroll, o el problema de cómo llegar a ser determinados por reglas racionales.Miguel Angel Quintana Paz - 2005 - In ¿Qué cultura?, vol. I. Madrid: Ediciones SM. pp. 145-159.
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  30. added 2017-05-27
    The Ladder of Rationality.Julian Fink - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):787-791.
    This paper is a review and critical discussion of John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning. In particular, it engages critically with Broome’s view on the independence of normative reasons and rationality, his construal of the capacity, property, and requirement senses of “rationality”, and his account of reasoning as a conscious, rule-following operation on mental contents.
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  31. added 2017-05-22
    Can Universities Save Us From Disaster?Nicholas Maxwell - 2017 - On the Horizon 52 (2):115-130.
    We face grave global problems. One might think universities are doing all they can to help solve these problems. But universities, in successfully pursuing scientific knowledge and technological know-how in a way that is dissociated from a more fundamental concern with problems of living, have actually made possible the genesis of all our current global problems. Modern science and technology have led to modern industry and agriculture, modern medicine and hygiene, modern armaments, which in turn have led to much that (...)
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  32. added 2017-02-24
    Breaking Out of the Circle.Caravello John - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (1):25-35.
    What’s wrong with begging the question? Some philosophers believe that question-begging arguments are inevitably fallacious and that their fallaciousness stems from a shared “formal” deficiency. In contrast, some philosophers, like Robinson deny that begging the question is fallacious at all. And others characterize begging the question as an “informal” fallacy of reasoning that can only be understood with the aid of epistemic notions. Sorensen joins this last camp by offering a powerful argument against both Robinson’s skepticism and fully formal approaches (...)
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  33. added 2017-02-02
    When Rational Reasoners Reason Differently.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - manuscript
    Different people reason differently, which means that sometimes they reach different conclusions from the same evidence. We maintain that this is not only natural, but rational. In this essay we explore the epistemology of that state of affairs. First we will canvass arguments for and against the claim that rational methods of reasoning must always reach the same conclusions from the same evidence. Then we will consider whether the acknowledgment that people have divergent rational reasoning methods should undermine one’s confidence (...)
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  34. added 2017-01-27
    Policy Externalism.Daniel Drucker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3).
    I develop and argue for a kind of externalism about certain kinds of non-doxastic attitudes that I call policy externalism. Policy externalism about a given type of attitude is the view that all the reasonable policies for having attitudes of that type will not involve the agent's beliefs that some relevant conditions obtain. My defense primarily involves attitudes like hatred, regret, and admiration, and has two parts: a direct deductive argument and an indirect linguistic argument, an inference to the best (...)
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  35. added 2016-10-12
    Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Reason to Believe in Accord with the Evidence.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3791-3809.
    Epistemic instrumentalists face a puzzle. In brief, the puzzle is that if the reason there is to believe in accord with the evidence depends, as the instrumentalist says it does, on agents’ idiosyncratic interests, then there is no reason to expect that this reason is universal. Here, I identify and explain two strategies instrumentalists have used to try and solve this puzzle. I then argue that we should find these strategies wanting. Faced with the failure of these strategies, I articulate (...)
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  36. added 2016-08-16
    A Reply to the Synchronist.Abelard Podgorski - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):859-871.
    On the face of it, in ordinary practices of rational assessment, we criticize agents both for the combinations of attitudes, like belief, desire, and intention, that they possess at particular times, and for the ways that they behave cognitively over time, by forming, reconsidering, and updating those attitudes. Accordingly, philosophers have proposed norms of rationality that are synchronic—concerned fundamentally with our individual time-slices, and diachronic—concerned with our temporally extended behaviour. However, a recent movement in epistemology has cast doubt on the (...)
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  37. added 2016-08-04
    Doxastic Permissiveness and the Promise of Truth.J. Drake - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4897-4912.
    The purpose of this paper is to challenge what is often called the “Uniqueness” thesis. According to this thesis, given one’s total evidence, there is a unique rational doxastic attitude that one can take to any proposition. It is sensible for defenders of Uniqueness to commit to an accompanying principle that: when some agent A has equal epistemic reason both to believe that p and to believe that not p, the unique epistemically rational doxastic attitude for A to adopt with (...)
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  38. added 2016-07-22
    Evidentielle Einzigkeit in klassischer und formaler Erkenntnistheorie.Jochen Briesen - 2017 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 71 (2):183-222.
    Die These der evidentiellen Einzigkeit besagt, dass es im Lichte von Gesamt-Evidenz E genau eine doxastische Einstellung – Für-Wahr-Halten, Für-Falsch-Halten, Enthaltung – gibt, die von Subjekten in Bezug auf eine beliebige Proposition rationalerweise eingenommen werden kann. Auf den ersten Blick ist diese These sehr plausibel. Der vorliegende Aufsatz diskutiert zunächst die Relevanz des Prin- zips sowohl in klassischen (nicht-formalen) sowie in formalen erkenntnistheoretischen Forschungstraditionen. Anschließend wird untersucht, wie plausibel das Prinzip bei genauerer Betrachtung tatsächlich ist und auf welchen Überlegungen dessen (...)
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  39. added 2016-06-28
    A Puzzle About Desire.Chase Wrenn - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (2):185-209.
    The following four assumptions plausibly describe the ideal rational agent. (1) She knows what her beliefs are. (2) She desires to believe only truths. (3) Whenever she desires that P → Q and knows that P, she desires that Q. (4) She does not both desire that P and desire that ~P, for any P. Although the assumptions are plausible, they have an implausible consequence. They imply that the ideal rational agent does not believe and desire contradictory propositions. She neither (...)
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  40. added 2016-06-17
    Dynamic Permissivism.Abelard Podgorski - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1923-1939.
    There has been considerable philosophical debate in recent years over a thesis called epistemic permissivism. According to the permissivist, it is possible for two agents to have the exact same total body of evidence and yet differ in their belief attitudes towards some proposition, without either being irrational. However, I argue, not enough attention has been paid to the distinction between different ways in which permissivism might be true. In this paper, I present a taxonomy of forms of epistemic permissivism (...)
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  41. added 2016-03-06
    Zagrożenie nauką bez cywilizacji: od wiedzy do mądrości (Polish translation of "The Menace of Science without Civilization: From Knowledge to Wisdom" (2012)).Nicholas Maxwell - 2011 - Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa 47 (189):269-294.
    We are in a state of impending crisis. And the fault lies in part with academia. For two centuries or so, academia has been devoted to the pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how. This has enormously increased our power to act which has, in turn, brought us both all the great benefits of the modern world and the crises we now face. Modern science and technology have made possible modern industry and agriculture, the explosive growth of the world’s population, global (...)
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  42. added 2015-11-04
    Instrumental Rationality in Psychopathy: Implications From Learning Tasks.Marko Jurjako & Luca Malatesti - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):717-731.
    The issue whether psychopathic offenders are practically rational has attracted philosophical attention. The problem is relevant in theoretical discussions on moral psychology and in those concerning the appropriate social response to the crimes of these individuals. We argue that classical and current experiments concerning the instrumental learning in psychopaths cannot directly support the conclusion that they have impaired instrumental rationality, construed as the ability for transferring the motivation by means-ends reasoning. In fact, we defend the different claim that these experiments (...)
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  43. added 2015-10-28
    Bridging Rationality and Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (12):633-657.
    This paper is about the connection between rationality and accuracy. I show that one natural picture about how rationality and accuracy are connected emerges if we assume that rational agents are rationally omniscient. I then develop an alternative picture that allows us to relax this assumption, in order to accommodate certain views about higher order evidence.
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  44. added 2015-10-25
    Ewing's Problem.C. Piller - 2007 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3 (1):0-0.
    Two plausible claims seem to be inconsistent with each other. One is the idea that if one reasonably believes that one ought to fi, then indeed, on pain of acting irrationally, one ought to fi. The other is the view that we are fallible with respect to our beliefs about what we ought to do. Ewing’s Problem is how to react to this apparent inconsistency. I reject two easy ways out. One is Ewing’s own solution to his problem, which is (...)
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  45. added 2015-10-25
    Restoring Emotion's Bad Rep: The Moral Randomness of Norms.Ronald De Sousa - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):29-47.
    Despite the fact that common sense taxes emotions with irrationality, philosophers have, by and large, celebrated their functionality. They are credited with motivating, steadying, shaping or harmonizing our dispositions to act, and with policing norms of social behaviour. It's time to restore emotion's bad rep. To this end, I shall argue that we should expect that some of the “norms” enforced by emotions will be unevenly distributed among the members of our species, and may be dysfunctional at the individual, social, (...)
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  46. added 2015-10-13
    Against the New Evidentialists.Susanna Rinard - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):208-223.
    Evidentialists and Pragmatists about reasons for belief have long been in dialectical stalemate. However, recent times have seen a new wave of Evidentialists who claim to provide arguments for their view which should be persuasive even to someone initially inclined toward Pragmatism. This paper reveals a central flaw in this New Evidentialist project: their arguments rely on overly demanding necessary conditions for a consideration to count as a genuine reason. In particular, their conditions rule out the possibility of pragmatic reasons (...)
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  47. added 2015-06-30
    Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against.Andrew Reisner - 2016 - In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 95-114.
    This chapter addresses an ambiguity in some of the literature on rational peer disagreement about the use of the term 'rational'. In the literature 'rational' is used to describe a variety of normative statuses related to reasons, justification, and reasoning. This chapter focuses most closely on the upshot of peer disagreement for what is rationally required of parties to a peer disagreement. This follows recent work in theoretical reason which treats rationality as a system of requirements among an agent's mental (...)
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  48. added 2015-06-04
    Rationality and its Contexts.Timothy Lane - 2016 - In Hung T. W. & Lane T. J. (eds.), Rationality: Constraints and Contexts. Elsevier. pp. 3-13.
    A cursory glance at the list of Nobel Laureates for Economics is sufficient to confirm Stanovich’s description of the project to evaluate human rationality as seminal. Herbert Simon, Reinhard Selten, John Nash, Daniel Kahneman, and others, were awarded their prizes less for their work in economics, per se, than for their work on rationality, as such. Although philosophical works have for millennia attempted to describe, explicate and evaluate individual and collective aspects of rationality, new impetus was brought to this endeavor (...)
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  49. added 2015-05-25
    Commentary On: Marcin Lewiński’s “‘You’Re Moving From Irrelevant to Irrational’—Critical Reactions in Internet Discussion Forums”.Gilbert Plumer - 2009 - In Juho Ritola (ed.), Argument Cultures. Proceedings of the 8th OSSA Conference [CD-ROM]. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. pp. 1-3.
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  50. added 2015-02-15
    Ideal Rationality and Logical Omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.
    Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place. This paper also defends an account of apriori justification for logical beliefs that is designed (...)
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