Rational Faith and Justified Belief

In Timothy O'Connor & Laura Frances Callahan (eds.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue. Oxford University Press. pp. 49-73 (2014)
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Abstract
In “Can it be rational to have faith?”, it was argued that to have faith in some proposition consists, roughly speaking, in stopping one’s search for evidence and committing to act on that proposition without further evidence. That paper also outlined when and why stopping the search for evidence and acting is rationally required. Because the framework of that paper was that of formal decision theory, it primarily considered the relationship between faith and degrees of belief, rather than between faith and belief full stop. This paper explores the relationship between rational faith and justified belief, by considering four prominent proposals about the relationship between belief and degrees of belief, and by examining what follows about faith and belief according to each of these proposals. It is argued that we cannot reach consensus concerning the relationship between faith and belief at present because of the more general epistemological lack of consensus over how belief relates to rationality: in particular, over how belief relates to the degrees of belief it is rational to have given one’s evidence
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Analysis of Faith.Bradley Rettler - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (9):e12517.
Testimony, Faith and Humility.Finlay Malcolm - forthcoming - Religious Studies.
The Moral and Evidential Requirements of Faith.Finlay Malcolm - forthcoming - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion.

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