Triangles, Tropes, and τὰ τοιαʋ ̃τα: A Platonic Trope Theory

Plato Journal: The Journal of the International Plato Society 18:9-24 (2018)
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A standard interpretation of Plato’s metaphysics holds that sensible particulars are images of Forms. Such particulars are fairly independent, like Aristotelian substances. I argue that this is incorrect: Platonic particulars are not Form images but aggregates of Form images, which are property-instances. Timaeus 49e-50a focuses on “this-suches” and even goes so far as to claim that they compose other things. I argue that Form images are this-suches, which are tropes. I also examine the geometrical account, showing that the geometrical constituents of the elements are also Form images. Thus everything in the sensible world is composed of tropes.

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Christopher Buckels
Junipero Serra High School


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