A Paradox of Evidential Equivalence

Mind:fzz046 (forthcoming)
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Our evidence can be about different subject matters. In fact, necessarily equivalent pieces of evidence can be about different subject matters. Does the hyperintensionality of ‘aboutness’ engender any hyperintensionality at the level of rational credence? In this paper, I present a case which seems to suggest that the answer is ‘yes’. In particular, I argue that our intuitive notions of 'independent' evidence and 'inadmissible' evidence are sensitive to aboutness in a hyperintensional way. We are thus left with a paradox. While there is strong reason to think that rational credence cannot make such hyperintensional distinctions, our intuitive judgements about certain cases seem to demand that it does.
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Index.Yablo, Stephen

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