Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief

Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3033-3049 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The epistemology of self-locating belief concerns itself with how rational agents ought to respond to certain kinds of indexical information. I argue that those who endorse the thesis of Time-Slice Rationality ought to endorse a particular view about the epistemology of self-locating belief, according to which ‘essentially indexical’ information is never evidentially relevant to non-indexical matters. I close by offering some independent motivations for endorsing Time-Slice Rationality in the context of the epistemology of self-locating belief.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-10-10
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
985 ( #6,231 of 72,517 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
76 ( #9,771 of 72,517 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.