- Imre Lakatos and a Theory of Rationality.Leslie Allan - manuscriptdetails
- Towards an Objective Theory of Rationality.Leslie Allan - manuscriptdetails
- On the Normativity of Rationality and of Normative Reasons.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - manuscriptdetails
- How Should Your Beliefs Change When Your Awareness Grows?Richard Pettigrew - manuscriptdetails
- What Rationality Is.Arif Ahmed - details
- Uniqueness and Modesty: How Permissivists Can Live on the Edge.Darren Bradley - forthcoming - Mind.details
- Rationality and Normativity.John Brunero - forthcoming - In International Encyclopedia of Ethics.details
- Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality.Marc-Kevin Daoust - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
- Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.details
- Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules.Marc-Kevin Daoust & Charles Côté-Bouchard - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-25.details
- Objectivism and Subjectivism in Epistemology.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.details
- Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.details
- Resolutions Against Uniqueness.Kenji Lota & Ulf Hlobil - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
- Towards a Unified Theory of Illocutionary Normativity.Neri Marsili - forthcoming - In Laura Caponetto & Paolo Labinaz (eds.), Sbisà on Speech as Action. Palgrave Macmillan.details
- Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality.Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
- Do the Standards of Rationality Depend on Resource Context?Eric Sampson - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-11.details
- Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Wes Siscoe - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.details
- Does Being Rational Require Being Ideally Rational? `Rational' as a Relative and an Absolute Term.Wes Siscoe - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.details
- Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press.details
- The Eclipse of Instrumental Rationality.Kurt Sylvan - forthcoming - In The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason.details
- Choice Functions and Hard Choices.M. Van Hees, A. Jitendranath & R. I. Luttens - forthcoming - Journal of Mathematical Economics.details
- Reasons and Rationality.Jonathan Way - forthcoming - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.details
- Recent Work on Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - forthcoming - Analysis.details
- Isolating Correct Reasoning.Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
- Evidence-Coherence Conflicts Revisited.Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
- Immodesty and permissivism.Marc-Kevin Daoust & David Montminy - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-21.details
- Smithies on Self-Knowledge of Beliefs.Brie Gertler - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):782-792.details
- Minimal Rationality: Structural or Reasons-Responsive?Jean Moritz Müller - 2022 - In Julien Deonna, Christine Tappolet & Fabrice Teroni (eds.), A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa. Genf, Schweiz:details
- Can Worsnip's Strategy Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Apparent Evidence?Paul Silva - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):339-351.details
- Rational Supererogation and Epistemic Permissivism.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):571-591.details
- The Dual Scale Model of Weighing Reasons.Chris Tucker - 2022 - Noûs 56 (2):366-392.details
- The Limits of Partial Doxasticism.Facundo M. Alonso - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly (2):326-345.details
- Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox.David James Barnett - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (2):227-262.details
- Ambivalence, Incoherence, and Self-Governance.John Brunero - 2021 - In Dimitria Gatzia & Berit Brogaard (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds. London, UK: Routledge.details
- Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1213-1223.details
- Should Agents Be Immodest?Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):235-251.details
- Deference Done Better.Kevin Dorst, Benjamin A. Levinstein, Bernhard Salow, Brooke E. Husic & Branden Fitelson - 2021 - Wiley: Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):99-150.details
- Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism.James Fritz - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (1):98-116.details
- A Puzzle for Evaluation Theories of Desire.Alex Grzankowski - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):90-98.details
- A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
- Arbitrariness and Uniqueness.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):665-685.details
- Emotions and Process Rationality.Oded Na’Aman - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):531-546.details
- Why Future-Bias Isn't Rationally Evaluable.Callie K. Phillips - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (4):573-596.details
- Morality and Practical Reasons.Douglas W. Portmore - 2021 - Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.details
- A New Anti-Expertise Dilemma.Thomas Raleigh - 2021 - Synthese (3-4):1-19.details
- What If Ideal Advice Conflicts? A Dilemma for Idealizing Accounts of Normative Practical Reasons.Eric Sampson - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1091-1111.details
- Veritism and the Normativity of Logic.Nader Shoaibi - 2021 - Ratio 34 (1):7-19.details
- Belief, Rational and Justified.Wes Siscoe - 2021 - Mind 130 (517):59-83.details
- Accuracy and Credal Imprecision.Dominik Berger & Nilanjan Das - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):666-703.details
- Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief.David Builes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3033-3049.details
|
Off-campus access
Using PhilArchive from home?
Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution's proxy server.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
Email
|
RSS feed
|
About us
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipisicing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.
|