Dion, theon, and the many-thinkers problem

Analysis 64 (3):242–250 (2004)
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Abstract
Dion is a full-bodied man. Theon is that part of him which consists of all of him except his left foot. What becomes of Dion and Theon when Dion’s left foot is amputated? In Burke 1994, employing the doctrine of sortal essentialism, I defended a surprising position last defended by Chrysippus: that Dion survives while the seemingly unscathed Theon perishes. This paper defends that position against objections by Stone, Carter, Olson, and others. Most notably, it offers a novel, conservative solution to the many-thinkers problem, a solution that enables us to accept the existence of brain-containing person-parts while denying that those person-parts are thinking, conscious beings.
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Archival date: 2016-02-19
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Objects and Persons.Merricks, Trenton

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Citations of this work BETA
Animalism.Bailey, Andrew M.
Ordinary Objects.Korman, Daniel Z.

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2009-01-28

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