Entitlement: The Basis for Empirical Epistemic Warrant

In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 37-142 (2020) Copy BIBT_EX

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University of California, Los Angeles

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Archival date: 2024-01-03
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Categories

Construction and Inference in Perception in Philosophy of Mind

Dogmatist and Moorean Replies to Skepticism in Epistemology

Perception and Knowledge, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

Perceptual Justification in Philosophy of Mind

Reliabilism about Justification in Epistemology

Science of Perception, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

The Nature of Perceptual Experience, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

The Problem of Easy Knowledge in Epistemology

Keywords

Warrant Entitlement Representational Function Perceptual Belief Skepticism Moore's Proof Subjective Bayesianism

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