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  1. added 2020-03-19
    The Rationality of Perception, by Susanna Siegel: New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, Pp. Xxv + 221, £45. [REVIEW]Bence Nanay - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):202-204.
    This is a review of Susanna Siegel's The Rationality of Perception.
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  2. added 2020-01-28
    Solving the Moorean Puzzle.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):493-514.
    This article addresses and resolves an epistemological puzzle that has attracted much attention in the recent literature—namely, the puzzle arising from Moorean anti-sceptical reasoning and the phenomenon of transmission failure. The paper argues that an appealing account of Moorean reasoning can be given by distinguishing carefully between two subtly different ways of thinking about justification and evidence. Once the respective distinctions are in place we have a simple and straightforward way to model both the Wrightean position of transmission failure and (...)
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  3. added 2019-12-31
    The Rationality of Perception: Replies to Lord, Railton, and Pautz.Susanna Siegel - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    My replies to Errol Lord, Adam Pautz, and Peter Railton's commentaries on The Rationality of Perception (2017).
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  4. added 2019-12-26
    The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity.Jason Russell - 2019 - International Journal of Social Sciences and Education Research 4 (2):01-19.
    The new narcissist is haunted not by guilt but by anxiety. He seeks not to inflict his own certainties on others but to find a meaning in life. Liberated from the superstitions of the past, he doubts even the reality of his own existence. Superficially relaxed and tolerant, he finds little use for dogmas of racial and ethnic purity but at the same time forfeits the security of group loyalties and regards everyone as a rival for the favors conferred by (...)
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  5. added 2019-12-21
    Explanations in Design Thinking: New Directions for an Obfuscated Field.Ameer Sarwar & Patrick Fraser - 2019 - She Ji: The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation 5 (4):343-355.
    Design plays an integral role in the functions of modern society. Yet the abstract process by which designers carry out their work is not obvious. The study of design thinking has grown in recent years into a major area of academic research, yet it presently lacks a clear theoretical basis; and as a discipline, its methodologies are disparate. Here, we outline and clarify the framework of the scholarly study of design thinking, introducing the major ideas and concepts upon which the (...)
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  6. added 2019-12-05
    Losing Knowledge by Thinking About Thinking.Jennifer Nagel - forthcoming - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification and Defeat. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Defeat cases are often taken to show that even the most securely-based judgment can be rationally undermined by misleading evidence. Starting with some best-case scenario for perceptual knowledge, for example, it is possible to undermine the subject’s confidence in her sensory faculties until it becomes unreasonable for her to persist in her belief. Some have taken such cases to indicate that any basis for knowledge is rationally defeasible; others have argued that there can be unreasonable knowledge. I argue that defeat (...)
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  7. added 2019-11-21
    "Introduction" - Ch 1 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification.
    In this introduction I present the topic of the investigation carried out in this book and the central theses defended in it. I also clarify some assumption of my research, specify the intended audience of this book and summarize its structure.
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  8. added 2019-11-12
    "Concluding Remarks" - Ch 6 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification.
    In this chapter I draw the conclusions of my investigation into phenomenal conservatism. I argue that phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually plagued by serious problems attributed to it by its opponents, but that it neither possesses all the epistemic merits that its advocates think it has. I suggest that phenomenal conservatism could provide a more satisfactory account of everyday epistemic practices and a more robust response to the sceptic if it were integrated with a theory of inferential justification. I also identify (...)
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  9. added 2019-10-29
    "Antiscepticism and Easy Justification" - Ch 5 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification.
    In this chapter I investigate epistemological consequences of the fact that seeming-based justification is elusive, in the sense that the subject can lose this justification simply by reflecting on her seemings. I argue that since seeming-based justification is elusive, the antisceptical bite of phenomenal conservatism is importantly limited. I also contend that since seeming-based justification has this feature, phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually afflicted by easy justification problems.
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  10. added 2019-10-14
    Why Should Warrant Persist in Demon Worlds?Peter Graham - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 179-202.
    In 'Perceptual Entitlement' (PPR 2003), Tyler Burge argues that on his teleological reliabilist account of perceptual warrant, warrant will persist in non-normal conditions, even radical skeptical scenarios like demon worlds. This paper explains why Burge's explanation falls short. But if we distinguish two grades of warrant, we can explain, in proper functionalist, teleological reliabilist terms, why warrant should persist in demon worlds. A normally functioning belief-forming process confers warrant in all worlds, provided it is reliable in normal conditions when functioning (...)
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  11. added 2019-09-02
    "The Bayesian Objection" - Ch 4 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification.
    In this chapter I analyse an objection to phenomenal conservatism to the effect that phenomenal conservatism is unacceptable because it is incompatible with Bayesianism. I consider a few responses to it and dismiss them as misled or problematic. Then, I argue that this objection doesn’t go through because it rests on an implausible formalization of the notion of seeming-based justification. In the final part of the chapter, I investigate how seeming-based justification and justification based on one’s reflective belief that one (...)
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  12. added 2019-08-19
    "Cognitive Penetrability" - Ch 3 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification.
    In this chapter I introduce the thesis that perceptual appearances are cognitively penetrable and analyse cases made against phenomenal conservatism hinging on this thesis. In particular, I focus on objections coming from the externalist reliabilist camp and the internalist inferentialist camp. I conclude that cognitive penetrability doesn’t yield lethal or substantive difficulties for phenomenal conservatism.
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  13. added 2019-08-19
    "Phenomenal Conservatism" - Ch 2 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer.
    In this chapter I introduce and analyse the tenets of phenomenal conservatism, and discuss the problem of the nature of appearances. After that, I review the asserted epistemic merits phenomenal conservatism and the principal arguments adduced in support of it. Finally, I survey objections to phenomenal conservatism and responses by its advocates. Some of these objections will be scrutinised and appraised in the next chapters.
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  14. added 2019-07-09
    Reflective Access, Closure, and Epistemological Disjunctivism.Giada Fratantonio - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.
    In this paper, I consider the so-called Access Problem for Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012). After reconstructing Pritchard’s own response to the Access Problem, I argue that in order to assess whether Pritchard’s response is a satisfying one, we first need an account of the notion of ‘Reflective Access’ that underpins Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism. I provide three interpretations of the notion of Reflective Access: a metaphysical interpretation, a folk interpretation, and an epistemic interpretation. I argue that none of these three (...)
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  15. added 2019-06-06
    Communication and Rational Responsiveness to the World.Robert Briscoe - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):135-159.
    Donald Davidson has long maintained that in order to be credited with the concept of objectivity – and, so, with language and thought – it is necessary to communicate with at least one other speaker. I here examine Davidson’s central argument for this thesis and argue that it is unsuccessful. Subsequently, I turn to Robert Brandom’s defense of the thesis in Making It Explicit. I argue that, contrary to Brandom, in order to possess the concept of objectivity it is not (...)
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  16. added 2019-06-05
    The Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Learning.Elijah Chudnoff - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):520-542.
    First impressions suggest the following contrast between perception and memory: perception generates new beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs; memory preserves old beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs. In this paper, I argue that reflection on perceptual learning gives us reason to adopt an alternative picture on which perception plays both generative and preservative epistemic roles.
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  17. added 2019-05-21
    Replies to Brewer, Gupta, and McDowell.Susanna Siegel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):403-410.
    "The Uneasy Heirs of Acquaintance" is my first-round contribution to a 4-way exchange with Bill Brewer, Anil Gupta, and John McDowell. In the first round, each of us writes a commentary on the other three, and in the second round we reply to each other's first-round contributions. This is my second-round contribution.
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  18. added 2019-04-25
    Locke on Empirical Knowledge.Nathan Rockwood - 2018 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 35 (4).
    This paper explores two related issues concerning Locke’s account of epistemic justification for empirical knowledge. One issue concerns the degree of justification needed for empirical knowledge. Commentators almost universally take Locke to hold a fallibilist account of justification, whereas I argue that Locke accepts infallibilism. A second issue concerns the nature of justification. Many (though not all) commentators take Locke to have a thoroughly internalist conception of justification for empirical knowledge, whereas I argue that he has a (partly) externalist conception (...)
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  19. added 2019-04-24
    Plenty of Room Left for the Dogmatist.Thomas Raleigh - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):66-76.
    Barnett provides an interesting new challenge for Dogmatist accounts of perceptual justification. The challenge is that such accounts, by accepting that a perceptual experience can provide a distinctive kind of boost to one’s credences, would lead to a form of diachronic irrationality in cases where one has already learnt in advance that one will have such an experience. I show that this challenge rests on a misleading feature of using the 0–1 interval to express probabilities and show that if we (...)
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  20. added 2019-03-23
    The Uneasy Heirs of Acquaintance.Susanna Siegel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):348-365.
    My contribution to the first round of a tetralog with Bill Brewer, Anil Gupta, and John McDowell. Each of us has written a response to the writings of the other three philosophers on the topic "Empirical Reason". My initial contribution focuses on what we know a priori about perception. In the second round, we will each respond to the each writer's first-round contributions.
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  21. added 2019-03-11
    The Arationality of Perception: Comments on Siegel (PPR).Adam Pautz - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 9.
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  22. added 2019-03-04
    Bias and Perception.Susanna Siegel - forthcoming - In Erin Beeghly & Alex Madva (eds.), An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind. Routledge.
    Draft of a chapter on perception and bias including implicit bias.
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  23. added 2019-02-28
    Review of Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (2007)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 337-347.
    Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior and this is his last work and crowning achievement. It belongs to his third and final period, yet it is not only his most basic work (since it shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms and that our conscious ratiocination is but icing on unconscious machinations), but as Daniele Moyal-Sharrock has recently noted, is a radical new epistemology and the foundation for all description (...)
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  24. added 2019-02-24
    Review of Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's Philosophy by David Pears (2006)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 295-301.
    Pears is an eminent philosopher, notable among W scholars for his “The False Prison: a study of the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy” in 2 volumes published 20 years ago. Based on these facts I expected some deep insights into W in the current volume. There were certainly some good points but overall it was profoundly disappointing. All of behavioral science is about our innate human nature and since W was the first to elucidate the axioms of our universal psychology, I (...)
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  25. added 2019-02-23
    Review of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy by Paul Horwich 248p (2013) (Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 142-165.
    Horwich gives a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is a leading W scholar, but in my view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably Searle also) then I don't see how one could have more than a superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all complex behavior (psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, society). In a (...)
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  26. added 2019-02-23
    Review of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology by Malcolm Budd 203p (1989)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas: Reality Press. pp. 246-266.
    A superb effort, but in my view Wittgenstein (i.e., philosophy or the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) is not completely understood by anyone, so we can hardly expect Budd, writing in the mid 80’s, without the modern dual systems of thought view, and no comprehensive logical structure of rationality, to have grasped him completely. Like everyone, he does not get that W’s use of the word ‘grammar’ refers to our innate Evolutionary Psychology and the general framework of Wittgenstein’s and (...)
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  27. added 2019-02-23
    Review of Wittgenstein-a Critical Reader Hans-Johann Glock (Ed.) (2001)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century -- Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 4th Edition Michael Starks. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 364-376.
    The aim of the 17 original papers here is to summarize and analyze Wittgenstein's thought. At the time these were being written, the Oxford/Intelex CDROM ($2040 on Amazon but available thru interlibrary loan and steeply discounted on the net) with 20,000 some pages of W's nachlass, as well as the various online versions of the nachlass, were not yet available, and only those fluent in German and willing to find and slog thru the incomplete Cornell microfilm were able to examine (...)
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  28. added 2018-11-11
    Neither/Nor.Clayton Littlejohn - 2019 - In Casey Doyle, Joe Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. Routledge.
    Abstract: On one formulation, epistemological disjunctivism is the view that our perceptual beliefs constitute knowledge when they are based on reasons that provide them with factive support. Some would argue that it is impossible to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible unless we assume that we have such reasons to support our perceptual beliefs. Some would argue that it is impossible to understand how perceptual experience could furnish us with these reasons unless we assume that the traditional view of experience (...)
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  29. added 2018-10-31
    Acquaintance, Conceptual Capacities, and Attention.Anders Nes - 2019 - In Jonathan Knowles & Thomas Raleigh (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 191-212.
    Russell’s theory of acquaintance construes perceptual awareness as at once constitutively independent of conceptual thought and yet a source of propositional knowledge. Wilfrid Sellars, John McDowell, and other conceptualists object that this is a ‘myth’: perception can be a source of knowledge only if conceptual capacities are already in play therein. Proponents of a relational view of experience, including John Campbell, meanwhile voice sympathy for Russell’s position on this point. This paper seeks to spell out, and defend, a claim that (...)
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  30. added 2018-10-21
    Replies to Nagel, Pautz, and Railton_2018 Eastern APA.Susanna Siegel - manuscript
    This handout contains my replies to comments on the Rationality of Perception by Jennifer Nagel, Adam Pautz, and Peter Railton from a symposium at the 2018 Eastern APA in Savannah.
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  31. added 2018-10-15
    Dysjunktywizm i natura percepcyjnej relacji.Paweł Zięba - 2016 - Analiza I Egzystencja 35:87-111.
    This paper surveys selected (though arguably representative) versions of metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism. Although they share a common logical structure, it is hard to find a further common denominator among them. Two main conclusions are: (1) a specific standpoint on the nature of perceptual relation is not such a common denominator, which means that it is very unlikely that all of these views could be refuted with a single objection; (2) contrary to what its name suggests, disjunctivism can be correctly (...)
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  32. added 2018-10-10
    Epistemic Elitism and Other Minds.Elijah Chudnoff - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):276-298.
    Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seeing a red light immediately justifies believing there is a red light. Other times the justification is mediate: seeing a red light justifies believing one should brake in a way that is mediated by background knowledge of traffic signals. How does this distinction map onto the distinction between what is and what isn't part of the content of experience? Epistemic egalitarians think that experiences immediately justify whatever is part of (...)
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  33. added 2018-08-31
    Perception as Guessing Versus Perception as Knowing: Replies to Clark and Peacocke.Susanna Siegel - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (4):761-784.
    A summary of The Rationality of Perception, and my replies to symposium papers on it by Andy Clark and Christopher Peacocke.
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  34. added 2018-07-22
    Amodal Completion and Knowledge.Grace Helton & Bence Nanay - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):415-423.
    Amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of perceived objects. We argue for the following three claims: First, at least some amodal completion-involved experiences can ground knowledge about the occluded portions of perceived objects. Second, at least some instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge are not sensitive, that is, it is not the case that in the nearest worlds in which the relevant claim is false, that claim is not believed true. Third, at least some instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge (...)
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  35. added 2018-07-05
    How to Be a Bayesian Dogmatist.Brian T. Miller - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):766-780.
    ABSTRACTRational agents have consistent beliefs. Bayesianism is a theory of consistency for partial belief states. Rational agents also respond appropriately to experience. Dogmatism is a theory of how to respond appropriately to experience. Hence, Dogmatism and Bayesianism are theories of two very different aspects of rationality. It's surprising, then, that in recent years it has become common to claim that Dogmatism and Bayesianism are jointly inconsistent: how can two independently consistent theories with distinct subject matter be jointly inconsistent? In this (...)
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  36. added 2018-06-21
    Em Defesa da Justificação Perceptiva: Desmistificando o Mito do Dado.Eros Carvalho - 2007 - Dissertation, Federal University of Minas Gerais
    Since Wilfrid Sellars' attack on sense-date theories, it became hard to understand the role of perceptual experience in the justification of beliefs about the world. Many philosophers have started to sustain that experience only causes beliefs, never justifies them. In this thesis, I defend that experience justifies empirical beliefs non-inferentially. I work out three senses of 'justification': basement, reason and warrant. The idea is that experience can be a reason to believe. The subject can base upon his experience in order (...)
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  37. added 2018-06-13
    Experience Does Justify Belief.Nicholas Silins - 2014 - In Ram Neta (ed.), Current Controversies In Epistemology. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 55-69.
    According to Fumerton in his "How Does Perception Justify Belief?", it is misleading or wrong to say that perception is a source of justification for beliefs about the external world. Moreover, reliability does not have an essential role to play here either. I agree, and I explain why in section 1, using novel considerations about evil demon scenarios in which we are radically deceived. According to Fumerton, when it comes to how sensations or experiences supply justification, they do not do (...)
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  38. added 2018-05-07
    The Rationality of Perception: Reply to Begby, Ghijsen, and Samoilova.Susanna Siegel - 2018 - Analysis (Reviews).
    Includes a summary of my book *The Rationality of Perception* (Oxford, 2017) and replies to commentaries on it by Endre Begby, Harmen Ghijsen, and Katia Samoilova. These commentaries and my summary and replies will be published soon in Analysis Reviews. Begby focuses on my analysis of the epistemic features of the interface between individual minds and their cultural milieu (discussed in chapter 10 of *The Rationality of Perception*), Ghijsen focuses on the notion of inference and reliabilism (chapters 5 and 6), (...)
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  39. added 2018-03-05
    Unconscious Perceptual Justification.Jacob Berger, Bence Nanay & Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):569-589.
    Perceptual experiences justify beliefs. A perceptual experience of a dog justifies the belief that there is a dog present. But there is much evidence that perceptual states can occur without being conscious, as in experiments involving masked priming. Do unconscious perceptual states provide justification as well? The answer depends on one’s theory of justification. While most varieties of externalism seem compatible with unconscious perceptual justification, several theories have recently afforded to consciousness a special role in perceptual justification. We argue that (...)
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  40. added 2018-02-21
    Cognitive Penetration and the Perception of Colour.Dustin Stokes - 2020 - In Derek Brown & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. London: Routledge.
    This chapter concerns the cognitive penetration of the visual experience of colour. Alleged cases of cognitively penetrated colour perception are of special import since they concern an uncontroversial type of visual experience. All theorists of perception agree that colour properties figure properly in the content or presentation of visual perception, even though not all parties agree that pine trees or causes or other "high-level" properties can figure properly in visual content or presentation. So an alleged case of this kind does (...)
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  41. added 2018-02-17
    Response to Critics.Jack Lyons - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):477-488.
    Response to Horgan, Goldman, and Graham. Part of a book symposium on my _Perception and Basic Beliefs_.
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  42. added 2018-01-13
    How Reliably Misrepresenting Olfactory Experiences Justify True Beliefs.Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Gatzia (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter argues that olfactory experiences represent either everyday objects or ad hoc olfactory objects as having primitive olfactory properties, which happen to be uninstantiated. On this picture, olfactory experiences reliably misrepresent: they falsely represent everyday objects or ad hoc objects as having properties they do not have, and they misrepresent in the same way on multiple occasions. One might worry that this view is incompatible with the plausible claim that olfactory experiences at least sometimes justify true beliefs about the (...)
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  43. added 2017-10-31
    Experience and Epistemic Structure: Can Cognitive Penetration Result in Epistemic Downgrade?Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Inference and Consciousness.
    Reflection on the possibility of cases in which experience is cognitively penetrated has suggested to many that an experience's etiology can reduce its capacity to provide prima facie justification for believing its content below a baseline. This is epistemic downgrade due to etiology, and its possibility is incompatible with phenomenal conservatism. I develop a view that explains the epistemic deficiency in certain possible cases of cognitive penetration but on which there is no epistemic downgrading below a baseline and on which (...)
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  44. added 2017-10-30
    Cognitive Penetration and the Epistemology of Perception.Nicholas Silins - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (1):24-42.
    If our experiences are cognitively penetrable, they can be influenced by our antecedent expectations, beliefs, or other cognitive states. Theorists such as Churchland, Fodor, Macpherson, and Siegel have debated whether and how our cognitive states might influence our perceptual experiences, as well as how any such influences might affect the ability of our experiences to justify our beliefs about the external world. This article surveys views about the nature of cognitive penetration, the epistemological consequences of denying cognitive penetration, and the (...)
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  45. added 2017-10-14
    Review of Radicalizing Enactivism by Hutto and Myin (2012).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks 3rd Ed. (2017).
    Probably the leading exponent of W’s ideas on the language games of inner and outer (the ‘Two Selves’ operation of our personality or intentionality or EP etc. ) the prolific Daniel Hutto’s (DH) approach is called ‘Radical Enactivism’ and is well explained in numerous recent books and papers. It is a development of or version of the Embodied Mind ideas now current and, cleansed of its jargon, it is a straightforward extension of W’s 2nd and 3rd period writings (though Hutto (...)
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  46. added 2017-08-16
    Replies to Beck, Chirimuuta, Rosenhagen, Smithies, and Springle.Susanna Siegel - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1).
    Replies to commentaries on "Can experiences be rational?", forthcoming in Analytic Philosophy.
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  47. added 2017-08-10
    Chinese translation of: <Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification, by Susanna Siegel>.Waguter Wang - manuscript
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  48. added 2017-03-02
    Epistemological Holism and Semantic Holism.William Cornwell - 2002 - In Yves Bouchard (ed.), Perspectives on Coherentism. Aylmar, Quebec: Editions du Scribe. pp. 17-33.
    This paper draws upon the works of Wilfred Sellars, Jerry Fodor, and Ruth Millikan to argue against epistemological holism and conceptual holism. In the first section, I content that contrary to confirmation holism, there are individual beliefs ("basic beliefs") that receive nondoxastic/noninferential warrant. In the earliest stages of cognitive development, modular processes produce basic beliefs about how things are. The disadvantage of this type of basic belief is that the person may possess information that should have defeated the belief but (...)
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  49. added 2017-03-01
    Is Perception Inferential?William Cornwell - 2004 - In Johan Christian Marek & Maria Elisabeth Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium: August 8-14, 2004, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Vol. XII. Niederosterreichkultur. pp. 80-82.
    Applying a theory of psychological modularity, I argue for a theory of defeasibility conditions for the epistemic justification of perceptual beliefs. My theory avoids the extremes of holism (e.g., coherentism and confirmation holism) and of foundationalist theories of non-inferential justification.
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  50. added 2017-03-01
    Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium: August 8-14, 2004, Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Vol. XII. Marek, Johann Christian & Maria Elisabeth Reicher (eds.) - 2004 - niederosterreichkultur.
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