Kripke on Theoretical Identifications: A Rejoinder to Perrick

Logique Et Analyse 31 (121-122):109-113 (1988)
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Abstract

This paper examines an argument of Saul Kripke for the necessity of theoretical identification statements and defends it against a criticism of M. Perrick ("Are Kripke's Theoretical Identifications Necessary Truths?", Logique et Analyse, Volume 115, September 1986, pages 381-384). It is argued that Perrick's criticism rests on a fallacy of ambiguity. Formal modal logic is used to examine a number of plausible interpretations of Kripke's argument, and Perrick's error is shown to arise from confusion concerning the scope of the modal necessity operator.

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