A pragmatic defense of Millianism

Philosophical Studies 138 (2):271 - 289 (2008)
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Abstract
A new kind of defense of the Millian theory of names is given, which explains intuitive counter-examples as depending on pragmatic effects of the relevant sentences, by direct application of Grice’s and Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory and uncontroversial assumptions. I begin by arguing that synonyms are always intersubstitutable, despite Mates’ considerations, and then apply the method to names. Then, a fairly large sample of cases concerning names are dealt with in related ways. It is argued that the method, as applied to the various cases, satisfies the criterion of success: that for every sentence in context, it is a counter-example to Millianism to the extent that it has pragmatic effects (matching speakers’ intuitions).
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Archival date: 2012-10-14
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References found in this work BETA
Relevance, Communication and Cognition.Sperber, Dan & Wilson, Deirdre
Literal Meaning.Recanati, François
Literal Meaning.Recanati, François
Situations and Attitudes.Barwise, Jon & Perry, John
Frege's Puzzle.Salmon, Nathan U.

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Citations of this work BETA
Propositions, Meaning, and Names.Haze, Tristan Grøtvedt
One Dogma of Millianism.Ball, Derek & Pickel, Bryan
One Dogma of Millianism.Ball, Derek & Pickel, Bryan

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