Features and Bugs in Schnieder’s Theory of Properties

Erkenntnis:1-6 (forthcoming)
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Although Benjamin Schnieder’s theory of the “ordinary conception” of properties successfully handles paradoxical properties—particularly, the property of non-self-instantiation—it fails to account for ordinary, non-pathological cases. The theory allows the inference of ‘a has the property of being F’ only given F(a) and the prior assertibility of ‘the property of being F can exist’. While this allows us to block an inference to a contradiction, it also blocks all of the non-pathological instances of the inference from ‘a is F’ to ‘a has the property of being F’. It thereby fails both as a theory of the ordinary conception and as a replacement of the ordinary notion, assuming the latter is defective.

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Arvid Båve
University of Lisbon


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