Interpretivism

European Review of Philosophy 3 (Response-Dependence):199-223 (1998)
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Abstract

In the writings of Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson we find something like the following bold conjecture: it is an a priori truth that there is no gap between our best judgements of a subject's beliefs and desires and the truth about the subject's beliefs and desires. Under ideal conditions a subject's belief-box and desire-box become transparent.

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Alex Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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