Perception and probability

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
One very popular framework in contemporary epistemology is Bayesian. The central epistemic state is subjective confidence, or credence. Traditional epistemic states like belief and knowledge tend to be sidelined, or even dispensed with entirely. Credences are often introduced as familiar mental states, merely in need of a special label for the purposes of epistemology. But whether they are implicitly recognized by the folk or posits of a sophisticated scientific psychology, they do not appear to fit well with perception, as is often noted. This paper investigates the tension between probabilistic cognition and non-probabilistic perception. The tension is real, and the solution—to adapt a phrase from Quine and Goodman—is to renounce credences altogether.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BYRPAP-2
Upload history
First archival date: 2021-02-21
Latest version: 3 (2021-02-23)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-02-21

Total views
113 ( #36,662 of 56,931 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
113 ( #5,116 of 56,931 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.