Between Non-Cognitivism and Realism in Ethics: A Three Fold Model

Prolegomena (Croatia) 10 (1):101-11202 (2011)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Abstracts The aim of the paper is to propose an alternative model to realist and non-cognitive explanations of the rule-guided use of thick ethical concepts and to examine the implications that may be drawn from this and similar cases for our general understanding of rule-following and the relation between criteria of application, truth and correctness. It addresses McDowell’s non-cognitivism critique and challenges his defence of the entanglement thesis for thick ethical concepts. Contrary to non-cognitivists, however, I propose to view the relation between the two terms of the entanglement as resulting from the satisfaction of a previously applied moral function. This is what I call a “Three-Fold Model”.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CALBNA
Revision history
First archival date: 2012-10-28
Latest version: 1 (2015-11-21)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2012-04-02

Total views
253 ( #14,185 of 43,724 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
43 ( #17,109 of 43,724 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.