Qua-Objects, (Non-)Derivative Properties and the Consistency of Hylomorphism

Metaphysica 24 (2):323-338 (2023)
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Imagine a sculptor who molds a lump of clay to create a statue. Hylomorphism claims that the statue and the lump of clay are two different colocated objects that have different forms, even though they share the same matter. Recently, there has been some discussion on the requirements of consistency for hylomorphist theories. In this paper, we focus on an argument presented by Maegan Fairchild, according to which a minimal version of hylomorphism is inconsistent. We argue that the argument is unsound or, at best, it just points to a well-known problem for hylmorphist theories. Additionally, we explore some general consequences of this fact.

Author Profiles

Sergi Oms
Universitat de Barcelona
Marta Campdelacreu
Universitat de Barcelona


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