The Dependence of Truth on Being: Is There a Problem for Minimalism?

In Miguel Hoeltje, Benjamin Schnieder & Alex Steinberg (eds.), Ontological Dependence, Supervenience, and Response-Dependence. Basic Philosophical Concepts Series,. Philosophia Verlag. pp. 297-324 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract. The aim of this paper is first to defend the intuition that truth is grounded in how things are and, second, to argue that this fact is consistent with Minimalism. After having cashed out that intuition in terms of explanatory claims of the form ‘if it is true that p, it is true that p because p’, I set out an argument against Minimalism which is based on the same intuition, and I argue that a strategy the minimalist could adopt to resist the argument, i.e. to deny the correctness of the intuition, is flawed. Then I explain why the intuition is correct and I make some claims concerning the kind of explanations which are involved in it. Now the stage is set up to present the right way for the minimalist to resist the argument. I finally answer some objections.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2012-07-05
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
500 ( #13,330 of 65,637 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #46,310 of 65,637 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.