Alguma Luz para O fundacionismo?

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Abstract
The foundationalist needs to deal with two fundamental problems: (i) to explain how a justificator grants justification without itself need justification and (ii) to determine the justificator’s epistemic status. Burdzinski (Burdzinski 2007), following Sellars and Bonjour, argues that the perceptive experience could not be a response to the first problem, because if its content was not propositional it would not grant justification and if its content was propositional it would grant justification and would require justification. My proposal is that perceptual experience justifies in virtue of its representational nature. The act of taking the content of a perception by its face value is justified until there is a reason to the contrary, ie, this act is prima facie justified. This forces us to answer the second problem by saying that the basic justificator is not infallible. This falibilist response dislike the skeptic, but it is the best foundationalist answer to epistemic regress.
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2009
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CARALP-3
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Archival date: 2019-07-08
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2013-12-01

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