- The Basing Relation and the Impossibility of the Debasing Demon.Patrick Bondy & J. Adam Carter - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):203-216.details
- Knowledge by Imagination - How Imaginative Experience Can Ground Knowledge.Fabiab Dorsch - forthcoming - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy.details
- The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons.Fabian Dorsch - forthcoming - In Fabian Dorsch & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford University Press.details
- Determined by Reasons: A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason, by Susanne Mantel. Review for Mind. [REVIEW]Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Mind.details
- Evidence and its Limits.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Conor McHugh Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press.details
- The Many Ways of the Basing Relation.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - forthcoming - In Joseph Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. London: Routledge.details
- The Epistemic Status of the Imagination.Joshua Myers - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.details
- Response to Oliveira on Doxastic Justification and the Basing Relation.Paul Silva Jr - forthcoming - In Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Perspectives in Epistemology. Routledge.details
- Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification.Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton M. Littlejohn (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy Evidence. Routledge.details
- Reasons and Basing in Commonsense Epistemology: Evidence From Two Experiments.John Turri - forthcoming - In J. Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well founded belief: new essays on the basing relation. Routledge.details
- Quasi-Dependence.Selim Berker - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:195-218.details
- Groundwork for a Fallibilist Account of Mathematics.Silvia De Toffoli - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly:1-22.details
- The Epistemic Role of Core Cognition.Zoe Jenkin - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):251-298.details
- The Superstitious Lawyer's Inference.J. Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy - 2019 - In Patrick Bondy & J. Adam Carter (eds.), Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Routledge.details
- Well-Founded Belief: An Introduction.J. Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy - 2019 - In J. Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Routledge.details
- Is Believing for a Normative Reason a Composite Condition?J. Cunningham - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3889-3910.details
- Basing for the Bayesian.Cameron Gibbs - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3815-3840.details
- Goodness-Fixing Isn’T Good Enough: A Reply to McHugh and Way.Ulf Hlobil - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1309-1318.details
- All Evidential Basing is Phenomenal Basing.Andrew Moon - 2019 - In J. Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 34-52.details
- Inference Without Reckoning.Susanna Siegel - 2019 - In Brendan Balcerak Jackson & Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press. pp. 15-31.details
- Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):409-430.details
- Solving the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Sinan Dogramaci - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):107-128.details
- The Peculiar Case of Lehrer’s Lawyer.Kevin Wallbridge - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1615-1630.details
- Baseless Knowledge.Guido Melchior - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (50):211-231.details
- A Note Concerning Infinite Regresses of Deferred Justification.Paul Thorn - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):349-357.details
- Learning From Learning From Our Mistakes.Clayton Littlejohn - 2016 - In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 51-70.details
- Non-Agential Permissibility In Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):389-394.details
- Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?Paul Silva - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):371-387.details
- Creative Reasoning.John Turri - 2014 - In John Turri & Peter Klein (eds.), Ad infinitum: new essays on epistemological infinitism. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 210-226.details
- Insensitive and Unsafe Knowledge.Guido Melchior - 2011 - In Epistemology: Context, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34th International Wittgenstein Symposium. pp. 196-198.details
- Believing For a Reason.John Turri - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.details
- On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.details
- Alguma Luz para O fundacionismo?Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2008 - Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 13 (1):35-65.details
- Em Defesa da Justificação Perceptiva: Desmistificando o Mito do Dado.Eros Carvalho - 2007 - Dissertation, Federal University of Minas Geraisdetails
- The Justification of Deductive Inference and the Rationality of Believing for a Reason.Gian-Andri Toendury - 2007 - Dissertation, Université de Fribourgdetails
- Epistemic Justice and the Principle of Total Evidence.Sherrilyn Roush - manuscriptdetails
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