A Note on Gödel, Priest and Naïve Proof

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Abstract
In the 1951 Gibbs lecture, Gödel asserted his famous dichotomy, where the notion of informal proof is at work. G. Priest developed an argument, grounded on the notion of naïve proof, to the effect that Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem suggests the presence of dialetheias. In this paper, we adopt a plausible ideal notion of naïve proof, in agreement with Gödel’s conception, superseding the criticisms against the usual notion of naïve proof used by real working mathematicians. We explore the connection between Gödel’s theorem and naïve proof so understood, both from a classical and a dialetheic perspective.
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First archival date: 2020-10-15
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2020-10-15

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