Negation, Expressivism, and Intentionality

Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Many think that expressivists have a special problem with negation. I disagree. For if there is a problem with negation, I argue, it is a problem shared by those who accept some plausible claims about the nature of intentionality. Whether there is any special problem for expressivists turns, I will argue, on whether facts about what truth-conditions beliefs have can explain facts about basic inferential relations among those beliefs. And I will suggest that the answer to this last question is, on most plausible attempts at solving the problem of intentionality, 'no'.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-07-03
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Thinking How to Live.Gibbard, Allan
Meaning.Grice, H. Paul

View all 56 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
42 ( #36,334 of 42,970 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
42 ( #16,376 of 42,970 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.