On the philosophical motivations for the logics of formal consistency and inconsistency

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We present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency, a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency within the object language. We shall defend the view according to which logics of formal inconsistency are theories of logical consequence of normative and epistemic character. This approach not only allows us to make inferences in the presence of contradictions, but offers a philosophically acceptable account of paraconsistency.
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Archival date: 2013-12-26
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