Semantic Inferentialism as (a Form of) Active Externalism

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Within contemporary philosophy of mind, it is taken for granted that externalist accounts of meaning and mental content are, in principle, orthogonal to the matter of whether cognition itself is bound within the biological brain or whether it can constitutively include parts of the world. Accordingly, Clark and Chalmers (1998) distinguish these varieties of externalism as ‘passive’ and ‘active’ respectively. The aim here is to suggest that we should resist the received way of thinking about these dividing lines. With reference to Brandom’s (1994; 2000; 2008) broad semantic inferentialism, we show that a theory of meaning can be at the same time a variety of active externalism. While we grant that supporters of other varieties of content externalism (e.g., Putnam 1975 and Burge 1986) can deny active externalism, this is not an option for semantic inferentialists: On this latter view, the role of the environment (both in its social and natural form) is not ‘passive’ in the sense assumed by the alternative approaches to content externalism.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CARSIA-9
Upload history
First archival date: 2016-01-17
Latest version: 2 (2016-02-24)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2016-01-17

Total views
226 ( #21,252 of 53,545 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #25,424 of 53,545 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.