Toward a Commonsense Answer to the Special Composition Question

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):475-490 (2015)
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Abstract
The special composition question is the question, ‘When do some things compose something?’ The answers to this question in the literature have largely been at odds with common sense, either by allowing that any two things compose something, or by denying the existence of most ordinary composite objects. I propose a new ‘series-style’ answer to the special composition question that accords much more closely with common sense, and I defend this answer from van Inwagen's objections. Specifically, I will argue that the proposed answer entails the transitivity of parthood, that it is non-circular, and that it casts some light on the ancient puzzle about the Ship of Theseus.
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2015
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CARTAC-4
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First archival date: 2014-11-15
Latest version: 6 (2018-10-09)
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On What Grounds What.Schaffer, Jonathan
Objects and Persons.Merricks, Trenton

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Composition.Korman, Daniel Z. & Carmichael, Chad

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2014-11-15

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