Results for 'Common Sense'

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  1. Common sense.Barry Smith - 1995 - In Barry Smith & David Woodruff Smith (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Husserl. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 394-437.
    Can there be a theory-free experience? And what would be the object of such an experience. Drawing on ideas set out by Husserl in the “Crisis” and in the second book of his “Ideas”, the paper presents answers to these questions in such a way as to provide a systematic survey of the content and ontology of common sense. In the second part of the paper Husserl’s ideas on the relationship between the common-sense world (what he (...)
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  2.  88
    Common-sense temporal ontology: an experimental study.Ernesto Graziani, Francesco Orilia, Elena Capitani & Roberto Burro - 2023 - Synthese 202 (6):1-39.
    Temporal ontology is the philosophical debate on the existence of the past and the future. It features a three-way confrontation between supporters of presentism (the present exists, the past and the future do not), pastism (the past and the present exist, the future does not), and eternalism (the past, the present, and the future all exist). Most philosophers engaged in this debate believe that presentism is much more in agreement with common sense than the rival views; moreover, most (...)
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  3. Common Sense and Comparative Linguistics.Lucas Thorpe - 2021 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 146 (1):71-88.
    I discuss the role of translatability in philosophical justification. I begin by discussing and defending Thomas Reid’s account of the role that facts about comparative linguistics can play in philosophical justification. Reid believes that common sense offers a reliable but defeasible form of justification. We cannot know by introspection, however, which of our judgments belong to common sense. Judgments of common sense are universal, and so he argues that the strongest evidence that a judgment (...)
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  4. Restoring Common Sense: Restorationism and Common Sense Epistemology.Blake McAllister - 2019 - In J. Caleb Clanton (ed.), Restoration & Philosophy. Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press. pp. 35-78.
    Alexander Campbell once declared “a solemn league and covenant” between philosophy and common sense. Campbell’s pronouncement is representative of a broader trend in the Restorationist movement to look favorably on the common sense response to skepticism—a response originating in the work of Scottish philosopher and former minister Thomas Reid. I recount the tumultuous history between philosophy and common sense followed by the efforts of Campbell and Reid to reunite them. Turning to the present, I (...)
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  5. Common Sense and Evidence: Some Neglected Arguments in Favour of E=K.Artūrs Logins - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):120-137.
    In this article I focus on some unduly neglected common-sense considerations supporting the view that one's evidence is the propositions that one knows. I reply to two recent objections to these considerations.
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  6. Science, Common Sense and Reality.Howard Sankey - manuscript
    Does science provide knowledge of reality? In this paper, I offer a positive response to this question. I reject the anti-realist claim that we are unable to acquire knowledge of reality in favour of the realist view that science yields knowledge of the external world. But what world is that? Some argue that science leads to the overthrow of our commonsense view of the world. Common sense is “stone-age metaphysics” to be rejected as the false theory of our (...)
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  7. Common-Sense Virtue Ethics and Moral Luck.Nafsika Athanassoulis - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):265-276.
    Moral luck poses a problem for out conception of responsibility because it highlights a tension between morality and lack of control. Michael Slote’s common-sense virtue ethics claims to avoid this problem. However there are a number of objections to this claim. Firstly, it is not clear that Slote fully appreciates the problem posed by moral luck. Secondly, Slote’s move from the moral to the ethical is problematic. Thirdly it is not clear why we should want to abandon judgements (...)
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  8. Common sense about qualities and senses.Peter W. Ross - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):299 - 316.
    There has been some recent optimism that addressing the question of how we distinguish sensory modalities will help us consider whether there are limits on a scientific understanding of perceptual states. For example, Block has suggested that the way we distinguish sensory modalities indicates that perceptual states have qualia which at least resist scientific characterization. At another extreme, Keeley argues that our common-sense way of distinguishing the senses in terms of qualitative properties is misguided, and offers a scientific (...)
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  9. Common-sense functionalism and the extended mind.Jack Wadham - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):136-151.
    The main claim of this paper is that Andy Clark's most influential argument for ‘the extended mind thesis’ (EM henceforth) fails. Clark's argument for EM assumes that a certain form of common-sense functionalism is true. I argue, contra Clark, that the assumed brand of common-sense functionalism does not imply EM. Clark's argument also relies on an unspoken, undefended and optional assumption about the nature of mental kinds—an assumption denied by the very common-sense functionalists on (...)
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  10. Common Sense and Ordinary Language: Wittgenstein and Austin.Krista Lawlor - forthcoming - In Rik Peels & René Van Woudenberg (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Common Sense Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    What role does ‘ordinary language philosophy’ play in the defense of common sense beliefs? J.L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein each give central place to ordinary language in their responses to skeptical challenges to common sense beliefs. But Austin and Wittgenstein do not always respond to such challenges in the same way, and their working methods are different. In this paper, I compare Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical positions, and show that they share many metaphilosophical commitments. I then (...)
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  11. Why Philosophy Can Overturn Common Sense.Susanna Rinard - 2013 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 185.
    In part one I present a positive argument for the claim that philosophical argument can rationally overturn common sense. It is widely agreed that science can overturn common sense. But every scientific argument, I argue, relies on philosophical assumptions. If the scientific argument succeeds, then its philosophical assumptions must be more worthy of belief than the common sense proposition under attack. But this means there could be a philosophical argument against common sense, (...)
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  12. Common-sense Realism and the Unimaginable Otherness of Science.Bradley Monton - 2007 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 11 (2):117-126.
    Bas van Fraassen endorses both common-sense realism — the view, roughly, that the ordinary macroscopic objects that we take to exist actually do exist — and constructive empiricism — the view, roughly, that the aim of science is truth about the observable world. But what happens if common-sense realism and science come into conflict? I argue that it is reasonable to think that they could come into conflict, by giving some motivation for a mental monist solution (...)
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  13. Humor, Common Sense and the Future of Metaphysics in the Prolegomena.Melissa Merritt - 2021 - In Peter Thielke (ed.), Kant's Prolegomena: A Critical Guide. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 9-26.
    Kant’s Prolegomena is a piece of philosophical advertising: it exists to convince the open-minded “future teacher” of metaphysics that the true critical philosophy — i.e., the Critique — provides the only viable solution to the problem of metaphysics (i.e. its failure to make any genuine progress). To be effective, a piece of advertising needs to know its audience. This chapter argues that Kant takes his reader to have some default sympathies for the common-sense challenge to metaphysics originating from (...)
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  14. Common Sense and Pragmatism: Reid and Peirce on the Justification of First Principles.Nate Jackson - 2014 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 12 (2):163-179.
    This paper elucidates the pragmatist elements of Thomas Reid's approach to the justification of first principles by reference to Charles S. Peirce. Peirce argues that first principles are justified by their surviving a process of ‘self-criticism’, in which we come to appreciate that we cannot bring ourselves to doubt these principles, in addition to the foundational role they play in inquiries. The evidence Reid allows first principles bears resemblance to surviving the process of self-criticism. I then argue that this evidence (...)
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  15. Common Sense and First Principles in Sidgwick's Methods.David O. Brink - 1994 - Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (1):179-201.
    What role, if any, should our moral intuitions play in moral epistemology? We make, or are prepared to make, moral judgments about a variety of actual and hypothetical situations. Some of these moral judgments are more informed, reflective, and stable than others (call these ourconsideredmoral judgments); some we make more confidently than others; and some, though not all, are judgments about which there is substantial consensus. What bearing do our moral judgments have on philosophical ethics and the search for first (...)
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  16.  78
    Reality, Common-sense, and Science.Heitor Matallo Junior - manuscript
    The article presents two antagonistic views of reality, one coming from modern science and the other from flat-Earthers, to discuss the relationships between common-sense, science, and reality. The concrete fact under analysis refers to the solar system and the position of the earth in this system, that is, the duality of geocentrism and heliocentrism. After discussing the reasons for denying geocentrism with arguments from theoretical physics, we return to discussing the duality against the backdrop of the history of (...)
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  17. Margaret MacDonald’s scientific common-sense philosophy.Justin Vlasits - 2022 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 30 (2):267-287.
    Margaret MacDonald (1907–56) was a central figure in the history of early analytic philosophy in Britain due to both her editorial work as well as her own writings. While her later work on aesthetics and political philosophy has recently received attention, her early writings in the 1930s present a coherent and, for its time, strikingly original blend of common-sense and scientific philosophy. In these papers, MacDonald tackles the central problems of philosophy of her day: verification, the problem of (...)
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  18. The Myth of the Common Sense Conception of Color.Zed Adams & Nat Hansen - 2020 - In Asa Maria Wikforss & Teresa Marques (eds.), Shifting Concepts: The Philosophy and Psychology of Conceptual Variability. Oxford University Press. pp. 106-127.
    Some philosophical theories of the nature of color aim to respect a "common sense" conception of color: aligning with the common sense conception is supposed to speak in favor of a theory and conflicting with it is supposed to speak against a theory. In this paper, we argue that the idea of a "common sense" conception of color that philosophers of color have relied upon is overly simplistic. By drawing on experimental and historical evidence, (...)
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  19. Common Sense in Metaphysics.Joanna Lawson - 2020 - In Rik Peels & René Van Woudenberg (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Common Sense Philosophy. pp. 185-207.
    It is widely accepted that it counts for a metaphysical theory when the theory is in accord with common sense and against a metaphysical theory when the theory clashes with common sense. It is unclear, however, why this should be the case. When engaging in metaphysics, why should we give common sense any weight? This chapter maintains that it is only against the backdrop of a particular metametaphysical stance that questions about metaphysical best practices (...)
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  20. Ontologies of Common Sense, Physics and Mathematics.Jobst Landgrebe & Barry Smith - 2023 - Archiv.
    The view of nature we adopt in the natural attitude is determined by common sense, without which we could not survive. Classical physics is modelled on this common-sense view of nature, and uses mathematics to formalise our natural understanding of the causes and effects we observe in time and space when we select subsystems of nature for modelling. But in modern physics, we do not go beyond the realm of common sense by augmenting our (...)
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  21. Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil.Chris Tweedt - 2015 - Faith and Philosophy 32 (4):391-403.
    The inductive argument from evil to the non-existence of God contains the premise that, probably, there is gratuitous evil. Some skeptical theists object: one's justification for the premise that, probably, there is gratuitous evil involves an inference from the proposition that we don't see a good reason for some evil to the proposition that it appears that there is no good reason for that evil, and they use a principle, "CORNEA," to block that inference. The common sense problem (...)
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  22. Scientific Realism and Basic Common Sense.Howard Sankey - 2014 - Kairos. Revista de Filosofia and Ciência 10:11-24.
    This paper considers the relationship between science and common sense. It takes as its point of departure, Eddington’s distinction between the table of physics and the table of common sense, as well as Eddington’s suggestion that science shows common sense to be false. Against the suggestion that science shows common sense to be false, it is argued that there is a form of common sense, basic common sense, which (...)
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  23. Against philosophical proofs against common sense.Louis Doulas & Evan Welchance - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):207–215.
    Many philosophers think that common sense knowledge survives sophisticated philosophical proofs against it. Recently, however, Bryan Frances (forthcoming) has advanced a philosophical proof that he thinks common sense can’t survive. Exploiting philosophical paradoxes like the Sorites, Frances attempts to show how common sense leads to paradox and therefore that common sense methodology is unstable. In this paper, we show how Frances’s proof fails and then present Frances with a dilemma.
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  24. Physics and Common Sense: A Critique of Physicalism.Nicholas Maxwell - 1966 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (February):295-311.
    In this paper I set out to solve the problem of how the world as we experience it, full of colours and other sensory qualities, and our inner experiences, can be reconciled with physics. I discuss and reject the views of J. J. C. Smart and Rom Harré. I argue that physics is concerned only to describe a selected aspect of all that there is – the causal aspect which determines how events evolve. Colours and other sensory qualities, lacking causal (...)
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  25. The Common Sense Personalism of St. John Paul II.Tarasiewicz Pawel - 2014 - Studia Gilsoniana 3 (supplement):619-634.
    The article aims at showing that the philosophical personalism of Pope John Paul II stems from the common sense approach to reality. First, it presents Karol Wojtyla as a framer of the Lublin Philosophical School, to which he was affiliated for 24 years before being elected Pope John Paul II; it shows Wojtyla’s role in establishing this original philosophical School by his contribution to its endorsement of Thomism, its way of doing philosophy, and its classically understood personalism. Secondly, (...)
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  26. Philosophical proofs against common sense.Bryan Frances - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):18-26.
    Many philosophers are sceptical about the power of philosophy to refute commonsensical claims. They look at the famous attempts and judge them inconclusive. I prove that, even if those famous attempts are failures, there are alternative successful philosophical proofs against commonsensical claims. After presenting the proofs I briefly comment on their significance.
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  27. Formal ontology, common sense, and cognitive science.Barry Smith - 1995 - International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 43 (5-6):641–667.
    Common sense is on the one hand a certain set of processes of natural cognition - of speaking, reasoning, seeing, and so on. On the other hand common sense is a system of beliefs (of folk physics, folk psychology and so on). Over against both of these is the world of common sense, the world of objects to which the processes of natural cognition and the corresponding belief-contents standardly relate. What are the structures of (...)
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  28. Grasp of concepts: common sense and expertise in an inferentialist framework.Pietro Salis - 2015 - In M. Bianca P. Piccari (ed.), Epistemology of Ordinary Knowledge. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 289-297.
    The paper suggests a distinction between two dimensions of grasp of concepts within an inferentialist approach to conceptual content: a common sense "minimum" version, where a simple speaker needs just a few inferences to grasp a concept C, and an expert version, where the specialist is able to master a wide range of inferential transitions involving C. This paper tries to defend this distinction and to explore some of its basic implications.
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  29. Debunking Rationalist Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology: An Empirical Approach.Robert Carry Osborne - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):197-221.
    Debunking arguments typically attempt to show that a set of beliefs or other intensional mental states bear no appropriate explanatory connection to the facts they purport to be about. That is, a debunking argument will attempt to show that beliefs about p are not held because of the facts about p. Such beliefs, if true, would then only be accidentally so. Thus, their causal origins constitute an undermining defeater. Debunking arguments arise in various philosophical domains, targeting beliefs about morality, the (...)
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  30. Science, Religion and Common Sense.Louis Caruana - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (4):161-173.
    Susan Haack has recently attempted to discredit religion by showing that science is an extended and enhanced version of common sense while religion is not. I argue that Haack’s account is misguided not because science is not an extended version of common sense, as she says. It is misguided because she assumes a very restricted, and thus inadequate, account of common sense. After reviewing several more realistic models of common sense, I conclude (...)
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  31. The structures of the common-sense world.Barry Smith - 1995 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 58:290–317.
    While contemporary philosophers have devoted vast amounts of attention to the language we use in describing and finding our way about the world of everyday experience, they have, with few exceptions, refused to see this world itself as a fitting object of theoretical concern. In what follows I shall seek to show how the commonsensical world might be treated ontologically as an object of investigation in its own right. At the same time I shall seek to establish how such a (...)
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  32. The Notion of ‘Common Sense’ in Thomas Reid.Vinícius França Freitas - 2020 - Discurso 50 (1).
    The paper aims to discuss the notion of ‘common sense’ in Thomas Reid’s philosophy. It presents two hypotheses. The first hypothesis states that the common sense that Reid uses in philosophical matters is nothing but the set of original principles of the mind that determine human beings in regard to their notions, beliefs and inclinations, as well as the judgments and beliefs that are due to these principles. The second hypothesis states that Reid understands a kind (...)
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  33. Leer hoy «Reason in Common Sense» de Santayana.Jaime Nubiola - 2017 - Limbo 37:11-34.
    In this article I pay attention to some of the reviews that Reason in Common Sense of George Santayana received from some of the most outstanding philosophers of his time: E. Albee, J. Dewey, A.W. Moore, G. E. Moore, C. S. Peirce and F. C S. Schiller. My paper is arranged in six sections: 1) Biographical circumstances of Reason in Common Sense; 2) Peirce’s reading of Santayana; 3) The reviews of John Dewey; 4) Other readers of (...)
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  34. Idealism and Common Sense.C. A. McIntosh - 2021 - In Joshua Farris & Benedikt Paul Göcke (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Idealism and Immaterialism. pp. 496-505.
    The question I wish to explore is this: Does idealism conflict with common sense? Unfortunately, the answer I give may seem like a rather banal one: It depends. What do we mean by ‘idealism’ and ‘common sense?’ I distinguish three main varieties of idealism: absolute idealism, Berkeleyan idealism, and dualistic idealism. After clarifying what is meant by common sense, I consider whether our three idealisms run afoul of it. The first does, but the latter (...)
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  35. Experts Of Common Sense: Philosophers, Laypeople And Democratic Politics.Itay Snir - 2015 - Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies 28:187-210.
    This paper approaches the question of the relations between laypeople and experts by examining the relations between common sense and philosophy. The analysis of the philosophical discussions of the concept of common sense reveals how it provides democratic politics with an egalitarian foundation, but also indicates how problematic this foundation can be. The egalitarian foundation is revealed by analyzing arguments for the validity of common sense in the writings of Thomas Reid. However, a look (...)
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  36. Ibn Taymiyya’s “Common-Sense” Philosophy.Jamie B. Turner - 2023 - In Amber L. Griffioen & Marius Backmann (eds.), Pluralizing Philosophy’s Past: New Reflections in the History of Philosophy. Springer Verlag. pp. 197-212.
    Contemporary philosophy of religion has been fascinated with questions of the rationality of religious belief. Alvin Plantinga—a prominent Christian philosopher—has contributed greatly to the exploration of these questions. Plantinga’s epistemology is rooted in the intuitions of Thomas Reid’s “common-sense” philosophy and has developed into a distinctive outlook that we may coin, Plantingian (Calvinist) Reidianism. This chapter aims to propose that, in fact, the central ideas of that outlook can be seen prior to Reid (and John Calvin), beyond the (...)
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  37. Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768-1800: A Contribution to the History of Critical Philosophy by Manfred Kuehn. [REVIEW]Gary Hatfield - 1990 - Isis 81 (3):574-575.
    A review of: Manfred Kuehn. Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768-1800: A Contribution to the History of Critical Philosophy. (McGill-Queen's Studies in the History of Ideas.) xiv + 300 pp., app., bibl., index. Kingston, Ont./Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987. $35.
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  38.  51
    The Uses of the Common Sense in Thomas Reid’s Philosophy.Vinícius França Freitas - 2019 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 64 (3):e32795.
    This paper aims to discuss the philosophical roles of common sense in Thomas Reid’s thought. I argue that there is not only one way of appealing to common sense in attempt of discovering truth and allowing knowledge. According to my understanding, Reid makes at least three distinct uses of common sense: (1) the foundational use, in which common sense is taken as the foundation upon which knowledge must be built; (2) the methodological (...)
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  39. Towards an ontology of common sense.Barry Smith - 1995 - In The British Tradition in Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky. pp. 300--309.
    Philosophers from Plotinus to Paul Churchland have yielded to the temptation to embrace doctrines which contradict the core beliefs of common sense. Philosophical realists have on the other hand sought to counter this temptation and to vindicate those core beliefs. The remarks which follow are to be understood as a further twist of the wheel in this never-ending battle. They pertain to the core beliefs of common sense concerning the external reality that is given in everyday (...)
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  40. Ignorance, Revision, and Common Sense.Randolph Clarke - 2017 - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition. Oxford, UK: pp. 233-51.
    Sometimes someone does something morally wrong in clear-eyed awareness that what she is doing is wrong. More commonly, a wrongdoer fails to see that her conduct is wrong. Call the latter behavior unwitting wrongful conduct. It is generally agreed that an agent can be blameworthy for such conduct, but there is considerable disagreement about how one’s blameworthiness in such cases is to be explained, or what conditions must be satisfied for the agent to be blameworthy for her conduct. Many theorists (...)
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  41. On the Common Sense Argument for Monism.Tuomas E. Tahko & Donnchadh O'Conaill - 2012 - In Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza On Monism. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 149-166.
    The priority monist holds that the cosmos is the only fundamental object, of which every other concrete object is a dependent part. One major argument against monism goes back to Russell, who claimed that pluralism is favoured by common sense. However, Jonathan Schaffer turns this argument on its head and uses it to defend priority monism. He suggests that common sense holds that the cosmos is a whole, of which ordinary physical objects are arbitrary portions, and (...)
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  42. Philosophy and Common Sense 2: Cultivating Curiosity.Sebastian Sunday Grève & Timothy Williamson - 2022 - The Philosophers' Magazine 96:24-30.
    Sebastian Sunday-Grève and Timothy Williamson discuss the relationship between curiosity and common sense.
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  43. The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense.S. A. Grave - 1960 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The purpose of this book is to piece together in some detail the philosophy of Common Sense from its fragmentary state in the writings of Thomas Reid and the other members of his school, to consider it in relation to David Hume, and to try and show the significance of its account of the nature and authority of common sense for present-day discussion.
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  44. Thomas Reid's Common Sense Philosophy of Mind.Todd Buras - 2019 - In Rebecca Copenhaver (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Early Modern and Modern Ages: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, vol. 4. New York, NY, USA: pp. 298-317.
    Thomas Reid’s philosophy is a philosophy of mind—a Pneumatology in the idiom of 18th century Scotland. His overarching philosophical project is to construct an account of the nature and operations of the human mind, focusing on the two-way correspondence, in perception and action, between the thinking principle within and the material world without. Like his contemporaries, Reid’s treatment of these topics aimed to incorporate the lessons of the scientific revolution. What sets Reid’s philosophy of mind apart is his commitment to (...)
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  45. Counterexamples and Common Sense: When (Not) to Tollens a Ponens.Meg Wallace - 2020 - Analysis 80 (3):544-558.
    Most ordinary folks think that there are ordinary objects such as trees and frogs. They do not think there are extraordinary objects such as the mereological sum of trees and frogs, as the permissivist does. Nor do they deny the existence of ordinary composite objects such as tables, as the eliminativist does. In his recent book, Objects: Nothing Out of the Ordinary, Korman positions himself alongside ordinary folk. He deftly defends the common sense view of ordinary objects, and (...)
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  46. Reid's defense of common sense.P. D. Magnus - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-14.
    Thomas Reid is often misread as defending common sense, if at all, only by relying on illicit premises about God or our natural faculties. On these theological or reliabilist misreadings, Reid makes common sense assertions where he cannot give arguments. This paper attempts to untangle Reid's defense of common sense by distinguishing four arguments: (a) the argument from madness, (b) the argument from natural faculties, (c) the argument from impotence, and (d) the argument from (...)
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  47. Ontology of common sense geographic phenomena: Foundations for interoperable multilingual geospatial databases.David M. Mark, Barry Smith & Berit Brogaard - 2000 - In 3rd AGILE Conference on Geographic Information Science. pp. 32-34.
    Information may be defined as the conceptual or communicable part of the content of mental acts. The content of mental acts includes sensory data as well as concepts, particular as well as general information. An information system is an external (non-mental) system designed to store such content. Information systems afford indirect transmission of content between people, some of whom may put information into the system and others who are among those who use the system. In order for communication to happen, (...)
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  48. Zum Verhältnis von Common Sense und wissenschaftlichem Naturbegriff.Gregor Schiemann - 2001 - In H. Franz (ed.), Wissensgesellschaft: Transformationen im Verhältnis von Wissenschaft und Alltag.
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  49. Hume and the Contemporary 'Common Sense' Critique of Hume.Lorne Falkenstein - 2016 - In Paul Russell (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of David Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 729-51.
    This paper reviews the principal objections that Hume's Scots "common sense" contemporaries had to his account of the understanding. In the absence of any but the most scant evidence of Hume's own reactions to these criticisms, it weighs what he might have said in his own defense.
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  50. Simulative reasoning, common-sense psychology and artificial intelligence.John A. Barnden - 1995 - In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications. Blackwell. pp. 247--273.
    The notion of Simulative Reasoning in the study of propositional attitudes within Artificial Intelligence (AI) is strongly related to the Simulation Theory of mental ascription in Philosophy. Roughly speaking, when an AI system engages in Simulative Reasoning about a target agent, it reasons with that agent’s beliefs as temporary hypotheses of its own, thereby coming to conclusions about what the agent might conclude or might have concluded. The contrast is with non-simulative meta-reasoning, where the AI system reasons within a detailed (...)
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