Clause-Type, Force, and Normative Judgment in the Semantics of Imperatives

In Daniel Fogal Daniel Harris & Matt Moss (eds.), New Work on Speech Acts. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I argue that imperatives express contents that are both cognitively and semantically related to, but nevertheless distinct from, modal propositions. Imperatives, on this analysis, semantically encode features of planning that are modally specified. Uttering an imperative amounts to tokening this feature in discourse, and thereby proffering it for adoption by the audience. This analysis deals smoothly with the problems afflicting Portner's Dynamic Pragmatic account and Kaufmann's Modal account. It also suggests an appealing reorientation of clause-type theorizing, in which the cognitive act of updating on a typed sentence plays a central role in theorizing about both its semantics and role in discourse.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CHACFA-10
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-12-12
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
What We Know and What to Do.Nate Charlow - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2291-2323.
Logic and Semantics for Imperatives.Nate Charlow - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):617-664.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-11-01

Total views
116 ( #19,447 of 37,198 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
48 ( #7,372 of 37,198 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.