Clause-Type, Force, and Normative Judgment in the Semantics of Imperatives

In Daniel Fogal Daniel Harris & Matt Moss (eds.), New Work on Speech Acts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 67–98 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
I argue that imperatives express contents that are both cognitively and semantically related to, but nevertheless distinct from, modal propositions. Imperatives, on this analysis, semantically encode features of planning that are modally specified. Uttering an imperative amounts to tokening this feature in discourse, and thereby proffering it for adoption by the audience. This analysis deals smoothly with the problems afflicting Portner's Dynamic Pragmatic account and Kaufmann's Modal account. It also suggests an appealing reorientation of clause-type theorizing, in which the cognitive act of updating on a typed sentence plays a central role in theorizing about both its semantics and role in discourse.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-12-12
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
611 ( #12,184 of 72,589 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
60 ( #12,807 of 72,589 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.