On Characterizing Metaphysical Naturalism

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The disciplinary characterisation (DC) is the most popular approach to defining metaphysical naturalism and physicalism. It defines metaphysical naturalism with reference to scientific theories and defines physicalism with reference to physical theories, and suggests that every entity that exists is a posited entity of these theories. DC has been criticised for its inability to solve Hempel’s dilemma and a list of problems alike. In this paper, I propose and defend a novel version of DC that can be called a historical paths approach. The idea is (roughly) that metaphysical naturalism can be defined with reference to the historical ideas that current scientific ideas descend from. I argue that it is not rendered implausible by the above problems, and hence that DC is more defensible and attractive than it may first appear. I then argue that the approach also provides a useful framework for the naturalisation of the philosophy of mind and phenomenology.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2020-03-03
Latest version: 6 (2021-06-15)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
285 ( #22,606 of 2,448,880 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
87 ( #6,632 of 2,448,880 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.