Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason

Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard (1997)
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Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If the answer to these questions is no, then in what areas do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? This book struggles with these questions, and arrives at distinctly different answers."

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Ruth Chang
Oxford University


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