- On the Relationship Between Reasons and Evidence.Christopher Cloos - manuscriptdetails
- Are All Practical Reasons Based on Value?Benjamin Kiesewetter - manuscriptdetails
- How to Compare Pragmatic and Alethic Reasons for Belief (Ch 2. Of The Pragmatic Foundations of Theoretical Reason).Andrew Reisner - manuscriptdetails
- Noumenal Power, Reasons, and Justification: A Critique of Forst.Sameer Bajaj & Enzo Rossi - forthcoming - In Ester Herlin-Karnell & Matthias Klatt (eds.), Constitutionalism Justified. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
- Which Reasons? Which Rationality?Daniel Fogal & Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.details
- Primary Reasons as Normative Reasons.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.details
- Rationality as the Rule of Reason.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - Noûs.details
- Weighing Explanations.Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star - forthcoming - In Andrew Reisner & Iwao Hirose (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome. Oxford University Press.details
- The Many Ways of the Basing Relation.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - forthcoming - In Joseph Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. London: Routledge.details
- Elusive Reasons and the Motivational Constraint.Benjamin Rossi - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.details
- Proprietary Reasons and Joint Action.Abraham Roth - forthcoming - In A. Fiebich (ed.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency.details
- Reasons, Competition, and Latitude.Justin Snedegar - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 16. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
- The Dual Scale Model of Weighing Reasons.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Noûs.details
- Review of Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical Reasoning, by Jonathan Dancy. [REVIEW]Jonathan Way - forthcoming - Ethics.details
- Creditworthiness and Matching Principles.Jonathan Way - forthcoming - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol 7. Oxford University Press.details
- Guided by Guided by the Truth: Objectivism and Perspectivism in Ethics and Epistemology.Daniel Whiting - forthcoming - In A. K. Flowerree & Baron Reed (eds.), Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere. Routledge.details
- Who's On First?Daniel Wodak - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15.details
- Reasons As Evidence Against Ought-Nots.Kok Yong Lee - 2021 - Philosophical Papers 49 (3):431-455.details
- Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure.Daniel Fogal - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1033-1070.details
- How Do Reasons Transmit to Non-Necessary Means?Benjamin Kiesewetter & Jan Gertken - 2020 - Tandf: Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.details
- Instrumental Reasons for Belief: Elliptical Talk and Elusive Properties.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 109-125.details
- A “Good” Explanation of Five Puzzles About Reasons.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):62-104.details
- Normative Reasons Without (Good) Reasoning.Artūrs Logins - 2019 - Ethics 130 (2):208-210.details
- Motivierende Gründe: Aktuelle Probleme und Kontroversen.Jean Moritz Müller - 2019 - Information Philosophie 2019 (4):16-28.details
- Promotion as Contrastive Increase in Expected Fit.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1263-1290.details
- Reasons and Beliefs.Attila Tanyi & Matteo Morganti - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Research 44:179-196.details
- Deflationary Pluralism About Motivating Reasons.Daniel Fogal - 2018 - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.details
- Normative Und Motivierende Gründe. Ein Kommentar Zu Susanne Mantels Determined by Reasons.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (3):421-428.details
- Subjective Unpossessed Reasons.Arturs Logins - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):262-270.details
- Two Thesis About the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In C. McHugh, J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 221-240.details
- Believing for Practical Reasons.Susanna Rinard - 2018 - Noûs (4):763-784.details
- Right in Some Respects: Reasons as Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2191-2208.details
- Eliminating Prudential Reasons.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 8:236-257.details
- In Defense of Content-Independence.Nathan Adams - 2017 - Legal Theory 23 (3):143-167.details
- Do We Need Partial Intentions?Avery Archer - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):995-1005.details
- The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.details
- Contextualism About Epistemic Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Kurt Sylvan - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge.details
- The Right and the Wrong Kind of Reasons.Jan Gertken & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12412.details
- Subject‐Relative Reasons for Love.Hichem Naar - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):197-214.details
- Circularity, Naturalism, and Desire-Based Reasons.Attila Tanyi - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (4):451-470.details
- Can Reasons Be Propositions? Against Dancy's Attack on Propositionalism.Attila Tanyi & Morganti Matteo - 2017 - Theoria 83 (3):185-205.details
- Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).details
- Perspectivism and the Argument From Guidance.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):361-374.details
- Against Second‐Order Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):398-420.details
- Reasons, Reason, and Context.Daniel Fogal - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. Oxford University Press.details
- Extrinsic Value and the Separability of Reasons.Barry Maguire - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 6.details
- Fittingness First.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):575-606.details
- Reasons Wrong and Right.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):371-399.details
- Reducing Reasons.Matthew Silverstein - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (1):1-22.details
- Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):364-376.details
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