Overriding Virtue

In Hilary Greaves & Theron Pummer (eds.), Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues. Oxford University Press. pp. 218-226 (2019)
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Abstract
If you focus your charitable giving on global causes where it will do the most good, how should you feel about passing by the local soup kitchen? Would the ideally virtuous agent have their (local) empathy still activated, but simply overridden by the recognition that distant others are in even greater need, leaving the agent feeling torn? Or would their empathetic impulses be wholeheartedly redirected towards the greatest needs? This chapter suggests a way to revise an outdated conception of moral virtue to better meet the demands of a cosmopolitan moral outlook.
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