Sensibilism, Psychologism, and Kant's Debt to Hume

Kantian Review 16 (3):325-349 (2011)
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Abstract
Hume’s account of causation is often regarded a challenge Kant must overcome if the Critical philosophy is to be successful. But from Kant’s time to the present, Hume’s denial of our ability to cognize supersensible objects, a denial that relies heavily on his account of causation, has also been regarded as a forerunner to Kant’s critique of metaphysics. After identifying reasons for rejecting Wayne Waxman’s recent account of Kant’s debt to Hume, I present my own, more modest account of this debt, an account that seeks to unite the two very different pictures of Kant’s relationship to Hume sketched above.
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First archival date: 2016-06-11
Latest version: 2 (2016-06-11)
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