The Possibility of Emergent Conscious Causal Powers

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):195-201 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

ABSTRACT Lewtas [2017] recently articulated an argument claiming that emergent conscious causal powers are impossible. In developing his argument, Lewtas makes several assumptions about emergence, phenomenal consciousness, categorical properties, and causation. We argue that there are plausible alternatives to these assumptions. Thus, the proponent of emergent conscious causal powers can escape Lewtas’s challenge.

Author Profiles

Lok-Chi Chan
National Taiwan University
Andrew James Latham
Aarhus University

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-06-16

Downloads
686 (#22,706)

6 months
165 (#19,045)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?