The problem with the Frege–Geach problem

Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665 (2014)
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I resolve the major challenge to an Expressivist theory of the meaning of normative discourse: the Frege–Geach Problem. Drawing on considerations from the semantics of directive language (e.g., imperatives), I argue that, although certain forms of Expressivism (like Gibbard’s) do run into at least one version of the Problem, it is reasonably clear that there is a version of Expressivism that does not
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The Moral Problem.Smith, Michael
Thinking How to Live.Gibbard, Allan
Epistemic Modals.Yalcin, Seth

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Impassioned Belief.Ridge, Michael

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