Accidentally true belief and warrant

Synthese 137 (3):445 - 458 (2003)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The Proper Functionist account of warrant – like many otherexternalist accounts – is vulnerable to certain Gettier-style counterexamples involving accidentally true beliefs. In this paper, I briefly survey the development of the account, noting the way it was altered in response to such counterexamples. I then argue that Alvin Plantinga's latest amendment to the account is flawed insofar as it rules out cases of true beliefs which do intuitively strike us as knowledge, and that a conjecture recently put forward by Thomas Crisp is also defective. I conclude by presenting my own suggestion as to how the account can be made less vulnerable to counterexamples involving accidentally true beliefs. Although I stay within the confines of Proper Functionism here, I think that my proposal (modulo a few details) could be attached to other externalist accounts of warrant as well.
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2014-01-11
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
448 ( #10,754 of 54,410 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #26,899 of 54,410 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.